On viewing the brilliant BBC documentary; Afghanistan: The Great Game - A Personal View by Rory Stewart I was compelled to think deeper about the nature of learning from previous military conflicts.
This has lead to me sharing several observations that I have investigated academically over the last 2 years, firstly an overall examination into the nature of military lessons (Lessons Learned) and secondly a more specific investigation into learning from previous counterinsurgencies in support of contemporary strategies (How Counterinsurgents Learn). Finally I offer an historical perspective and conclusion.
It is an often quoted adage that we ignore previous lessons, experiences and history at our peril. Certainly the view presented by Rory Stewart in the Afghanistan context points to this; British, Soviet Union, US and coalition forces making similar mistakes over the course of 170 years of warfare. A counter argument suggests we can draw conclusions to quickly in discovering similarities, an even more critical approach could suggest that previous failures drive military and government to attempts to overcome problems which themselves, allies and enemies have previously failed.
Does this mean that governments and military planners will continually make mistakes which historical evidence could of helped avoid, or are conflicts separate entities to be viewed as individual events separate from previous and future similarities. I hope the following essays will shed some light, both theoretically and in direct reference to contemporary events.
Tuesday 21 August 2012
Monday 20 August 2012
No One Really Learns ‘Lessons Learned’
“In every new set of engagements post-World War II – Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq – we have discovered, after the fact, things we should have known because they’d been learned previously. What this suggests is that, though the military publishes and even distributes them, no one really learns ‘lessons learned’” [Simons A: IN Mc Ivor AD [ed]: Rethinking the Principles of War, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2005, page 336]
George Santayana warns ‘Those that do not learn from the lessons of the past are condemned to repeat them.’[1] This view is often held by many as a fundamental approach to history, nowhere is it perceived more applicable than with in military planning and application. Yet this ignores the largely held and debated view that the military does not take heed of ‘lessons learned.’ The idea that military lessons are ignored is the centre of wide reaching debate for and against this view, but more critically is the subject of both scholarly and militarily review as to why this occurs and to what extent do lessons learned have in a new generation of warfare. Analysts and Historians provide deep arguments either way; William Fuller acknowledges the importance of military lessons but warns of their shelf life. Anthony Cordesman concludes that though it is useful to try ‘understanding the whole nature of modern conflict is impossible.’[2] In contrast Schandler speaks of the extent lessons from Vietnam have affected the contemporary military policies. To this extent I aim to establish what lessons learned are, to what extent they are ignored and crucially that the lessons of previous wars have changing relevance in today’s warfare. The US involvement in Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq will be the main conflicts examined in the establishment of to what extent lessons are remembered, this in its self will provide insight on where lessons can be learned from.
The idea of a military lesson can roughly be summarised into several different aspects; historical lessons, operational lessons, methods and wrong methods. Historical lessons are the by product of thousands of years of warfare, some are enshrined in the works of famous military theorists such as Sun Tzu or Clausewitz whilst other historical lessons are simpler and have evolved due to mankind’s growth being interlinked with warfare. Operational lessons are the result of a certain military experience and can be seen on many levels from the functionality of equipment in the operational environment, to operational performance of units and command structure. Yet it is with methods and wrong methods that the most examined lessons learned emerge; it is here military analysts find out how every aspect from planning, execution and aftermath has affected the overall outcome. It is from these guidelines we can gain an overall sense of military lessons, it is important to view them as working in conjunction, where historical lessons and operational experience are often hidden away in military commentaries, methods employed and even more often methods that fail are at the forefront of military studies. A wrong method by its very nature is likely to cause problems and therefore be more prevalent; the failure in Vietnam will always overshadow any successful methods that were employed and completely obscure the operational efficiency of a piece of equipment. Body bags will always count for more than new tactics and that lack of tolerance for casualties is echoed in all critics and does lend a certain bias to an engrained sense of failure. Yet it is from all these aspects that lessons are learnt.
It is from these different levels that a problem of assessing the attention to lessons learned emerges; at what level do these lessons get incorporated? This can be seen in the way they are presented. As stated the army publishes and distributes them; the Joint Commands host ‘lessons learned’ databases and there are ‘516 volumes in the Naval war colleges archives that contain lesson in the title.’[3] It does not stop at just archiving lessons, a long list of distributed works are manuals which directly convey lessons learnt, to all ranks of the military forces. For example between 1963 and 1973 ‘FM 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces, FM 31-16 Counterguerilla Operations and PAM 550-104 Human Factors of Underground Insurgencies’[4] were all being widely distributed in a time which both contemporary and modern critics have criticised for a lack of reaction to the new threats of warfare. Therefore it is crucial to consider that the working documents of the military do incorporate lessons that may simply be overlooked based on what level they are acted upon. A key rule proposed in 1967 field manual warns of ‘the dangers of separating ourselves from the people.’[5] This plays right into the argument of lessons are learnt, but then ignored, when considering the subsequent wars in which the US managed to alienate the very people they went to help. However another option must be proposed that this and other key lessons were acted upon operationally and on the ground but failed to reach into the overall incorporation required for such tactics to take hold; the adoption into overall policy and grand strategy controlled not by the soldiers operationally or the writers of military manuals but the Overall Military Commanders and Senior politicians.
Far from being just a defence of soldiers actions, the assessment on where ‘lessons learned’ are incorporated has much deeper contexts. For example in Somalia, one of the overlooked sides of the conflict was the increased political role of officers on the ground and their interactions with locals in both negotiation and hostile situations, whilst this was performed well and incorporated as part of the operational functions of field commanders, it was swiftly forgotten by senior officers and planners with the withdrawal from the country. This can be coupled with the aforementioned operational lessons in terms of incorporating lessons learned into strategy; operational experiences which lead to new methods, often only become apparent after a certain period in conflicts as accounts and different experiences are pooled together. The experiences of a unit on the ground in Baghdad being different from those faced by a unit operating in the desert based oil fields. It is to this extent therefore that to establish the full extent of how much attention is paid to these lessons their adoption must be analysed on both the ground and at the Command level. Furthermore this affects how lessons learnt are put through the military system some come from experience on the ground and filter up where others have been adopted into grand strategy and are indoctrinated into military operations from above.
It would be hard to argue that the military does not ignore previous lessons, there are too many examples to the contrary, Iraq and Afghanistan both represent examples of this, military planners ignored previous lessons on counterinsurgency such as the tactics used by Vietnamese, or the urban lessons of Somalia. The crux of the matter therefore is to how deep does this lesson learned ignorance run, Simons mentions the fact that things that had been previously learnt are ignored yet this is fundamentally tied to the way military planners want to perceive war as conventional. The last 65 years of warfare has been dominated by an unprecedented change in how wars are fought, but the Military has seemed to ignore this in its Operational functions. Where the opportunity has existed for constant updating and revision of its practises it has reverted to type in sticking to forcing conventional solutions on unconventional situations. No finer example exists than in Cordesman’s review of lessons learnt after 8 years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq; insure valid reasons for war, fully understand host country and overall ‘do not commit to conventional conflict if unready for unconventional follow up.’[6] These lessons are not new and appear in some form in major reviews and histories of the Vietnam conflict. The main and most far reaching element of the ignorance toward lessons learnt is the fact unconventional warfare is not the most prominent element of military planning. Documents such as the Air force doctrine prove that the continued planning is within the frameworks of conventional warfare. Nearly every commentary from Afghanistan and Iraq continue to mention the unprepared state the army found itself in when the combat shifted from conventional to unconventional operations. If such doctrines are to be drawn from experience, the Vietnam and Somalia examples are there, but lessons can also be drawn from history, any post imperial colonial uprising provides a history of the growing reliance of irregular warfare and US backed groups such as the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan brings it even closer to home. As referred to in over half the texts Clausewitz states it clearly, the ‘most important rule for the statesman is to know what kind of war on which they are embarking.’[7]
To move away from the doctrinal problems; further examples of the far reaching ignorance of lessons learned and their implications lie within the various Arms of the military. The need for a clearer doctrine based on past lessons can easily be seen in the use of air power. Vietnam showed the original limitations; its limited ability in the combat against the Vietcong, not only was air power restricted under President Johnson, even when used to full effect it was estimated ‘$6.00 was spent to do $1.00 of damage.’[8] Where adaptations have been made supremacy is still only felt in the conventional stages of Iraq and Afghanistan, it has had further reduced effect in the prolonged war against insurgency. The US Air force doctrine mentions the ‘power to control the enemy’s military, economic and political power at risk.’[9] This is completely ignoring the lessons learned and overlooks an enemy that operates outside conventional military boundaries and has little economic and political goals other than humiliation of the US. The use of Armour has also been the source of oversight in its role in unconventional warfare, the slow progress in narrow conditions during the battle of Mogadishu, the vulnerability to roadside bombs and the limitations of urban use; ‘insurgents hidden in buildings or rubble are little more vulnerable to a 2001 M1A2 than to a 1918 Mark IV.’[10] While this view may overlook certain aspects of amours psychological effects on both enemy and friendly forces it does present two key points that have been learned but not necessarily instigated to the full. That technology cannot provide victory in unconventional war. Technology should not be overlooked, drones for example provide excellent intelligence resources, but should never be a replacement for human intelligence. Furthermore the very technology that is used to fight these wars is what has driven the enemy to use ‘unconventional warfare as the only way to challenge post industrial states.’[11] Secondly the overall importance that warfare still needs men on the ground.
The need for men on the ground however not only brings us back to the lesson of the need for a clear strategic aim but it also begins to highlight the counterargument, that lessons learned do not hold all the answers. Firstly though the reliance of men on the ground is a lesson from the very beginnings of warfare, to win you need men to put forward control; yet the experiences of the USA’s modern wars have presented a much harder concept, the nation building aspect, where frontline troops become the very symbol of not a regime of outside control but the supposed reconstruction of a political system. In every example it has failed Vietnam had too weak a government to defend, Iraq has been unleashed into religious and political violence due to the lack of a strong leader and Afghanistan is so fractured that it is considered by ‘to be no longer a nation.’[12] Once again the planners overlooked previous experiences FMFRP 12-14 from Vietnam speaks of the importance of civil skills, World War II a wealth of German and Japanese fluent officers were created to deal with occupation and interaction. the Somalia experience of frontline interactions; yet still in Afghanistan in 2004 Brigadier General Blackledge was warning of ‘a shortage of civil officer experts’[13] However it is with this, that lessons learned can be turned on their head the very fact they are not incorporated goes to highlight the lack of options that face a military power that cannot fathom the idea that their system will not work elsewhere. The very idea that a western political system will not be embraced can in fact be alien to US military planners, all commentaries continue to outline the need of increased nation building by the military but ignore the most important ideas that ‘war will not have an outcome where a desirable government, economy society and alliance will magically occur at the end of the fighting.’[14] Countries like Afghanistan and Iraq have no cultural basis for western democracy and therefore will not embrace it. Afghanistan is an even stronger example due to the resistance of another political imposition attempted by the USSR. This therefore means that if the military is going to ignore lessons in both military application on the ground, in its various planning and doctrinal elements; but most crucially in the way it feels it can justify the very wars it fights there is a large lack of a learning curve.
This is not a turn to a liberal attitude of the view of contemporary wars; though the growing media attitude surrounding deaths in both Iraq and Afghanistan does provide a voice to those views. Yet ironically the way to find how the military does learn, harks back to the liberalism felt in the US during the Vietnam war; that is it learns the hard way through defeat. Vietnam was so ingrained into the American memory through veterans, films and the death toll that it went beyond enforcing lessons it took them too far. Somalia was a prime example of this the fear of an death toll combined with the loss of two of its technological symbols in black hawk helicopters forced a feeling of what Baumann calls ‘Vietmalia’[15] and the subsequent approach to warfare that involves minimum risk and maximum protection. This can be seen in the planning for the Gulf war which had the casualty estimation much higher than anticipated and relied heavily on conventional air force supremacy. Yet if this is an example of how the military learns it is also twinned with another flawed attitude to lessons that is ‘US lesson learning is only one deep,’[16] i.e. the last war. This view may go to show why the Operations went ahead in both Iraq and Afghanistan; following the overall tactical success of the first Gulf war. Yet that victory, as well as all the contemporary conventional stage victories, play in to the counter arguments of both that lessons are not ignored, or that they are not always applicable.
Victory in conventional warfare stages of contemporary conflicts do take on lessons from previous wars, the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom used General Tommy Franks knowledge and research on the First Gulf War, and Central Command managed to ‘execute an operation that took out Iraq’s military forces, removed Saddam and seized the oil infrastructure in 21 days.’[17] Yet it was the same Command that refused to recognize the insurgency problem for 11 months before openly admitting it was no longer the death throes of the old regime. Other elements of each modern war has had its tactical moments or skillful operations; In Vietnam the army never lost a battle to the North Vietnamese Army, yet these are overshadowed by the supposed lessons against the Viet Cong. Statistical based arguments favour in the ignorance of some lessons learned they count as too many variables in a already hard to predict business, predictions for victories based on statistical models are less accurate than tossing a coin’[18]Yet while the argument exists for both the ignorance of lessons learned and the counter that they are used; another option is present in that it is these very lessons which present the biggest problem to the planning and operations of the military. For a start the very idea of military lessons are argued so much there is no clear agreement within the historiography of certain areas, what may be taken as established by one is dismissed by another. Wolhstetter of the RAND cooperation warned ‘of all the disasters of Vietnam, the worst may be the lessons that we’ll draw from it.’[19] Whilst others such as Summers draw conclusions from such lessons. This is just part of the problem however as one massive effect must be taken into consideration; the fact that doctrinal planning, adoption of lessons learned and all military planning at one stage or another involves some form of history, which is therefore open to interpretation.
History remains the key aspect of doctrinal development, whilst experience is important ‘the army does not make strategy,’[20] that a role lies with politicians, and they therefore have the role in interpreting the history of conflicts in search of a strategic framework. The problem of interpretation is that it is unique to an individual’s perception. The historical context of war also has deep roots that influence the overall reliance on conventional war. Fuller points out that three styles exist in interpretation. The antique; a reliance on the unchanging nature of war. The positivist view; war as progressive, changing with industry and development. Finally the pragmatic view; war has no set precedent and is ever changing. The fact that warfare encounters the problems of ignoring lessons learned can be traced back to the reliance on set parameters of war. The Clausewitzian view of knowing what war one is facing does not take into account the war may not have any precedent at all. The idea can be developed in two ways. Firstly, a new interpretation of old wars or secondly, the idea that modern wars are unprecedented. The later idea has implications of fourth Generation warfare, an enemy unrestrained by western boundaries, it is becoming part of military thought FM 3-24 warns ‘you cannot fight an Islamic extremist the way you have fought the Viet Cong.’[21]However this view ignores that you do not have to fight them the same way but you should be aware of similarities. Far more credible is the former idea which put forward by Jonathan Gomez which does not link insurgency warfare purely to the present and suggests lessons from throughout history which have been held back by the ideas of conventional warfare embodied by chivalry and religious context. It is further suggested that the very embodiment of insurgency warfare was present in every major war and therefore lessons should not be grouped into the old frameworks such as modern and middle age warfare.
To Conclude it is important to remember warfare is a human enterprise and as such has many variables that cannot be simply be seen as clear cut as the experiences of the last war. The enemy learns lessons and adapts; as such this review has place in the larger context of the global lessons by both side in changing warfare. Lessons learned take on different styles and locations and to establish whether they are being ignored it is first important to establish at what level do certain lessons fit in, Grand Strategy or operational tactics. The idea of what extent they are being ignored again is not a straight answer as shown it requires the need to establish what kind of framework it fits into, conventional lessons are still being applied, but it is there use in conventional warfare that is blocking the experience of other lessons picked up which fit into more unconventional parameters. The last war should be as relevant as much earlier historical basis. The most important factor though is are these lessons learned relevant, yes they have relevance but must not be viewed two dimensionally, they should interact outside of traditional frameworks, and influence a wider range of military thought, one not constrained by the harsh reality of if things going wrong. If new conflicts are the exporting of democracy, lessons will need to be different and fit in far more with adaptable policy than strict operational procedures, FM 3-24 does hint this may be happening through a lesson that cannot be ignored ‘war is a game of wits and you have to adapt to survive.’[22]
Bibliography
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Biddle, Stephen, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004)
Baker, James A. And Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage 2006)
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Kiras, James, ‘Irregular Warfare’ Understanding Modern Warfare ed. David Jordan and others, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008),pp. 222-266
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Luttwak, Edward. ‘Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractise’, Harpers Magazine, 2 (2007), 33-42
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[1] William C. Fuller, ‘What is a Military Lesson?’, in Strategic Studies, A Reader, ed. by Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp.34-50 (p.34).
[2]Fuller, p.48.
[3]Ibid, p.36.
[4] James Kiras, ‘Irregular Warfare’ Understanding Modern Warfare ed. David Jordan and others, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008),pp. 222-266 (p.262).
[5]United States Marine Corps, FMFRP 12-41 Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam 1967 (Washington D.C: Department of the Navy. 1989), p.438.
[6]Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build: "The Uncertain Lessons of the Afghan & Iraq Wars’, Centre for Strategic Studies and International Studies (2009) http://csis.org/publication/shape-clear-hold-and-build-uncertain-lessons-afghan-iraq-wars.html (accessed 11 January 2010) ( p.4).
[7] Fuller, p.34.
[8] Mark Clodfelter, The limits of Air Power: the American bombing of North Vietnam (London: Collier Macmillan, 1989), p.134.
[10] Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.53.
[11] Kiras, p.229.
[12] Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘The Ongoing lessons of Afghanistan: War fighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation and Nation Building’, Centre for Strategic Studies and International Studies (2004) http://csis.org/publication/ The-Ongoing-lessons-of-Afghanistan: War fighting-Intelligence- Force-Transformation-and-Nation-Building.html (accsesd 11 January 2010) (p.29).
[13] Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘The Ongoing lessons of Afghanistan’,p.81.
[14] Ibid, p.150.
[15] Robert Baumann and LawrenceYates, My clan against the world : US and coalition forces in Somalia, 1992-1994 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004) http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/clan.pdf (accessed 11 January 2010) (p.169).
[16] Baumann,and Yates, p.191.
[17] Kiras,p.227.
[18] Biddle,p.21.
[19] Austin Long, On ‘Other War’ Lessons From Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), p.14.
[20] Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (New York: Dell 1984), p.2.
[21] United States Marine Corps, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, (Washington D.C: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006), p.1.
[22] United States Marine Corps, FM 3—24, p.1.
How Counterinsurgents Learn from History and Experience.
“The Experience of the past years clearly shows that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by military means only” (Tsagoiov 1987, cited in Hughes 2008 p.1), a statement that rings true two decades later, making the US seem to have overlooked history; but when Colonel Tsagoiov summed up the Soviet experience it also showed a disregard for a whole range of previous military experiences by themselves and others. To this extent parallels can be drawn from across history which show examples of militaries seemingly ignoring the lessons of counterinsurgency (COIN) and making the same mistakes, which either they or other countries have previously made. To the cynical this represents an ongoing trend of reliance on conventional force and being geared to fight the previous war; to moderates a lack of adaptation; but what this view overlooks is the general and in recent years concise effort to learn from history and experience. As Fuller points out, since Vietnam the US army has kept ‘lessons learned’ databases and an extensive catalogue of experience based literature (Fuller 2008 p.36) furthermore the recent explosion of COIN literature focuses most of its recommendations from success and failure in the past. This essay will therefore outline how practitioners of COIN make an effort to learn from history and experience, but it will also analyse their shortcomings. By reviewing the application of history we can see its merits, but also where the blinkered approach ignores wider historical lessons. Furthermore I will explain how some of the lessons from history are unsuitable for application in situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan and that strategy, culture and an approach to warfare as a whole, are all equally as critical factors in COIN.
The divisions over the application of history and experience fall into various groups, with some arguing the benefits of historical study and others seeing it as limited in its application, W. Fuller claims that the concept of a military lesson might be dubious (2008 p.44) where as J.F.C. Fuller claims that to ignore the application of historical experience turns its study into “nothing but a bloody romance” (1926, cited in Cordesmann 2004b). It is wiser to consider that historical experience does indeed have its place but as I will show, has limitations based upon the differences between situations. It is also important to remember the scope of history in context with learning from it. COIN literature tends to focus on the period Kilcullen calls, classic COIN experience and theory, mainly from 1944-1980 (2006 p.112). This, however, overlooks the early years of COIN in its colonial setting at the turn of the century, such as the Boer War or the US in the Philippines. Furthermore, it ignores many of the earlier examples of dealing with insurgency, such as situations from the Napoleonic wars right back to the Roman Empire. As Beckett argues, insurgency has been a factor of war since the start of history and is mentioned in antiquity such as in the Bible, by Tacitus or by Sun Tzu (2001 p.8). This is not to say I advocate the reliance on classical history as being the same as modern problems but as Gumz explains there is a potential for a greater understanding of history by moving away from the conventional to non-conventional evolution of warfare which creates rigid frames of old and new. (2009). Therefore, understanding there is a bias to the ideas of new wars helps us understand how counterinsurgents learn from history. Quite rightly, they wish to find examples that fit with warfare in an age of globalisation, human rights, global terrorism and the internet. This therefore leads to looking closer to the modern age rather than delving deep into the history books, but two ideas should be considered. Firstly, there is no direct precedent for many of the new elements of warfare. Secondly, operational and tactical experiences of the last 60 years have been tailored for application in today’s COIN environments, so why can examples from 200 years ago not be as well? To answer the latter would be to veer off into perspectives of military history, but it is important to consider when analysing what militaries adopt and learn from.
Regardless of which historical perspective and scope, various scholars who have used the literature in the last decade have been almost unanimous at pointing to the same recommendations, failings and lessons that the US and its coalition partners need to address. Namely, legitimacy, good governance, unity of effort, interagency approach, winning over the population and committing to COIN both in terms of time and approach. These ideas are built upon the experiences of COIN since World War II and represent the efforts to analyse experience and use its lessons for the current situations. Empirically, the recommendations are obviously related to historical experiences, the interagency and leadership examples can be seen as products of the problems of split civilian, intelligence and military approach of the US in Vietnam; the good governance and population support where key approaches of the British in Malaya. Both failures and successes become key to the development of COIN yet it would be wrong to think the literature was ultimately forward thinking in its recommendations, using history as the basis for its study.
As Reis explains in his analysis of British, French and Portuguese COIN, “doctrines emerge as reactions to ongoing campaigns” (2006 p.33), similarly the approaches being suggested by RAND and FM 3-24 are in reaction to the current situations and then using history to back these suggestions up. This then differs from conventional military history, which traditionally uses a war to update its approaches, but ultimately means militaries are fighting the last war. In the situation of COIN the use of history is not linear with analyses being made by fishing experience from the past. As previously mentioned, this is not necessarily a bad approach, nor is it right to think that literature has not existed prior to recent years. The doctrinal changes suggested in the 1960s, in addition to the works of Galula, show that there has been COIN available, but the sudden boost in COIN material; with more books written in the 4 years before 2006 than there had been in the previous 4 decades (Kilcullen 2006 p.111) showing that COIN history is chequered and reactionary rather than evolutionary.
Based on this view the analysis of how counterinsurgents learn reaches a crossroads, it could be argued that this use of history and experience is entirely justified; indeed there is nothing wrong with seeking historical evidence to back up the desired contemporary approach. Yet it is more prudent to accept this as the norm but highlight the inherent problems of such an approach and then couple this with the problems of adapting COIN history as a whole. The most cynical analysis would say that in adapting COIN in a reactionary fashion actually shows that counterinsurgents do not learn from history and experience, but rather borrow from it when the situation requires. This certainly seems apparent with the almost parallel development of COIN doctrines in the Vietnam and then Iraq wars (Long 2008). Yet to agree entirely with this view would mean to ignore genuine efforts by some, such as special forces, academics and forward thinkers to put COIN history in the mainstream and its experiences into doctrine throughout the decades where it “waxed and waned” (Long 2006). It then becomes more prudent to accept this as a genuine deficit in the learning process of COIN and actually identify this as a historical experience lesson in its own right; “Vietmalia” (Holbrooke 1998, cited in Baumann and Yates 2004 p.2) is a genuine fear, much like Lieutenant Colonel Francois explains Algeria was for the French (2007). Not only do countries learn from COIN operations, they can also learn they do not like them, especially one with a deep mark on the nation’s history. It would be naive to think that COIN situations could be avoided, as they have evolved as the only challenge available to the militaries that were built up, ironically under the massive focus on conventional warfare doctrines. Yet it goes someway to explaining why COIN took a back seat post Vietnam, when the Cold War and threat of European conventional war was still a possibility and that its history is now undergoing resurgence due to operational requirement.
Fundamentally that is not the problem; the problem arises in two by-products of such an approach. Firstly and theoretically, will this be the case at the conclusion of every COIN operation, as it is seen as different to the conventional warfare that doctrines and armies are primarily designed for? Secondly, does such an approach bring further problems due to its wish to find answers from the past? To answer the first in line with the essay, it is hard to predict but the question is an important consideration into how militaries and politicians look at COIN. As Long points out after Iraq there are possibly other conventional enemies (2008) and to truly learn from COIN would be to keep its experiences indoctrinated even if not directly in use. The second point is a clear signpost to deeper analysis of how COIN history is used. It is true to say that most current military assessments and commentators recommendations are happy to use prior experiences yet are wary of their application. From the start FM 3-24 clearly outlines “you cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic Extremists the same way as we fought the Viet Cong” (US Department of the Army 2006 p.1). Even concurrent successful COIN operations cannot be directly applied to others hence Glenn’s chapter “Fitting RAMSI’s square peg into the world’s round hole” (2007 p.12). In itself this represents a crucial historical COIN lesson that success in one area is not directly transportable, be that on a tactical, regional, historical or as demonstrated here, operational level. Such an understanding therefore shows that the contemporary approach to COIN does have a logical historical approach.
Where the logic falls down however, is that such an approach inevitably leads to a less then concise historical analysis; making the lessons borrowed from experience be taken very generally rather than truly scrutinising them for the factors behind victory or failure. As previously mentioned, the successes of the British in Malaya are cited as good examples for COIN but their experiences are taken generally in terms of good governance and being population-centric, as the overall experience is considered a relic of Imperialism and hard to apply due to its colonial setting (Reis 2005 p.31). In only taking general lessons, some of the deeper operational and tactical experiences are therefore overlooked; the British use of civil expertise, autonomy of battalion structure, use of ID cards and importance of low level command, have direct links with the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan but get ignored due to its colonial and therefore seemingly limited application. (Mackinlay and al-Baddawy 2008) This can of course be turned on its head, in that in addition to ignoring some of the deeper lessons of previous COIN and despite FM 3-24’s assurance of the difference of current situations; recommendations and commentaries try to find suitable historical examples for the situations that are simply unprecedented. Cynically this could be a guilty response to the gap in COIN history, but nevertheless the need to back up suggestions with historical experience will seemingly fall flat in the search for answers to global jihad, internet propaganda and non-regional insurgents. As Olson points out there are now ungovernable areas as a product of global media and globalisation which are new options for insurgents (2007).Furthermore whilst Islamic ideals can be studied this does not offer an operational strategy for COIN on the ground. Historically COIN has not got a great success record and seen as many of the options are considered of limited use due to their colonial or historical setting, those seeking to find answers are left with few options. Whilst Mackinlay and al-Baddawy point to a deeper understanding of the Israel and Palestine experience as a possible source for answers (2008); we see that there is also a deficit in militaries learning from the experiences of those outside doctrinal similarities. As Thompson pointed out, COIN has a national history and is rarely developed from the experiences of others (1969, cited in Mackinlay and al-Baddawy 2008 p.8). Whilst this has evolved to those sharing similar experiences through coalitions it explains why the Soviet experience in Afghanistan was ignored and points out the avoidance of the darker side of COIN; barbarism.
A paradox emerges when considering barbarism in COIN, quite rightly would be counterinsurgents seek to avoid it, eschewing its use both currently and finding no positives from its historical use. It serves as a reminder of failures; such as the French in Algeria and also galvanises the principles of population support, legitimacy and good governance. Its avoidance also covers up the chilling but realistic view of the power that outright barbarism has in stopping insurgency; whether it be massacres by the Ottomans, Romans or Nazis, the idea of “making a wasteland and calling it peace” (Tacitus n.d., cited in Luttwak 2007 p.41) still represents the impracticable side of COIN. Several considerations arise from this, such as are there any useful elements from the barbarism style of COIN? Or does it represent an alternative security and order discourse? Yet whilst it is unlikely COIN practitioners will ever try and separate the positives of Roman style deterrence from the barbarism, what emerges instead is the aforementioned paradox. The paradox is that separating desired COIN from a barbaric approach is a cultural decision as much as it is a strategic and operational one; and that culture is one of the crucial areas where counterinsurgents fail to address. Not only a cultural understanding of the nation or area where COIN is to take place, but an understanding of their own culture, both how it effects COIN development and how it is perceived by those who COIN seeks to influence.
The former and latter points are among the many findings of the COIN literature based from the historical experiences which point to the need to understand a nation’s culture and how to portray one’s own. It is perhaps the lesson which seems to be the hardest to follow despite its historical basis. Certainly the latter point, as all prior experience points to the need for population support leading to the rise of the “strategic privates and civilians” (Kilcullen 2006 p.114) as direct embodiments of the mission and culture of the COIN operation. This lesson is merged with all others as it effects the approaches of the operation; it can explain why democracy and human rights are used to try and achieve COIN, but without an understanding of the host culture it can lead to failure. Thus it can be all traced back to the main analysis of how counterinsurgents learn from history and experience and ultimately it is through the lens and framework of a nation’s strategic culture.
To use the USA as an example is prudent as they are driving force behind today’s COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the example is not limited to them. Britain’s COIN is shaped by its former Imperial culture; the Soviet approach in Afghanistan was influenced by its repressive culture. The USA, as Gray points out, ignores the traits which build up its strategic culture and are ultimately damaging to COIN operations ; being apolitical, astrategic, techno-dependent, focused on firepower, offensively balanced, culturally challenged, ahistorical and impatient (2006). Whilst all the points contribute to the USA’s approach it is the last 3 that seemingly fly in the face of learning from historical experience. As Gray further demonstrates US COIN if not its whole approach to war in general has suffered since the Indian wars with “a failure to understand the enemy of the day” (2006 p.34) Furthermore the approach to the past at best demonstrates a staggered reactionary learning process and at worst plays into the hands of those who accuse militaries of not learning from the past. Rightly or wrongly parallels are drawn with Vietnam and the ‘body bag effect’ sidesteps the massive difference in casualty figures; as Colin Powell stated about Somalia “what wouldn’t have merited a press conference in Vietnam” (Baumann and Yates 2004 p.2) lead to inglorious withdrawal in Somalia. There are those who still have an axe to grind over Vietnam and there are those to which history was in the past and that is where it shall stay; both are dangerous options for formulating COIN strategy. Yet it is Gray’s mention of impatience that is the best indicator in an analysis of learning from history.
Time is ultimately the measurement of COIN operations; success and failure are linked with a change in government, the withdrawal from a country, but as the old adage states ‘only time will tell’. Time enshrines actions into history and then ultimately the process of scrutinising places the experience into a framework for those who seek to learn from it. That is what is happening now, and will continue to do so. Yet no conclusion can be complete without the major consideration put forward in FM 3-24 “there is no silver bullet” (2006 p.1-28). COIN is marked by paradoxes; you can win militarily but lose overall, or more security can make you less secure. Only when viewed as an ever changing landscape can an assessment of how counterinsurgents learn from the past truly come forward, I have previously argued the change in military affairs and an observation made there is equally relevant here; “it is important to remember warfare is a human enterprise and as such has many variables, that cannot be as clear cut as the experience of the last war” (Cheetham 2009 p.9). What that presents us with models not templates (Glenn 2007) and that the use of history and experience is not the holy grail of COIN.
That being said, those who ignore history do so at their peril, it is why we have arrived at the sudden need for past COIN examples and the growth in those seeking them, in conclusion one must consider the ignorance of previous decades as well as the current situation. It would be wrong to fall into of the trap of saying counterinsurgents do not learn from the past. Evidence is clear that efforts are made, though it has been a roundabout process in which examples for the past are sought to back up contemporary analyses. Many lessons of history are still ignored, yet in addition so are many contemporary recommendations. This relates to the simple fact that all the literature, doctrines and ideas do not put boots on and go to Iraq or Afghanistan. Learning from COIN experience is only half the problem; implicating and using those lessons is an equally difficult task. Overall, COIN is part of a wider approach that straddles the grey area of political and military policy and only with a correct strategy can a solid COIN operation be conducted; a strategy, which is ultimately influenced by experience and strategic culture thus compounding the need to understand history and its lessons. Counterinsurgents learn from history by comparing the need of the day with lessons of the past. There is still more that could be adopted in analysis and it needs to happen on a larger scale than just at a recommendation and doctrinal level, but overall it is a better approach than the denial seen in previous years. “Historical feasibility” (Kalev 2005 p.12) has become a key part of developing ideas, considering it took several years of COIN failure to bring this approach in, one can only hope that after the current set of engagements end it remains part of the process.
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