Lone Wolf Terror

Last week The Royal United Service Institute warned of the growing threat of lone wolf terrorists as in coming years Britons fighting and training with radical groups in Somalia and Yemen will return to the UK.

The question is then what does threat does the lone terrorist pose? The simple answer would be to assume that a lone actor is capable of achieving similar if slightly reduced results to terrorist cells, but whilst this is feasible it is perhaps more prudent to look at the different possibilities posed by a single actor than the possible similarities.

'The super empowered angry man' is a different actor to a small terrorist cell, for a start whilst sharing ideals and motives with a larger cause or terrorist organisation the motives and catalysts for action can be much more individually serving. In theory there are many more triggers that could cause a loner to act, from national to specific local issues. Unlike a terror cell which must adopt a group mentality to act, the individual is only concerned with his actions. Similarly the groupthink attitude which can influence a cells actions does not apply.

This can interpreted in many ways, while numbers can provide strength, support, logistical help and a greater will to act the lone actor is not constrained by the limiting factors such as need for meetings and planning with others. This in turn leads to the question of detection, with the communication and group element removed an individual actor can become harder to track as they are potentially harder to detect. Yet that must be considered objectively, any individual acting suspiciously round potential targets or in purchasing materials could be detected as easily as any group, it is the lack of a network or communication group that would potentially making detection harder.

A lone terrorist would have different target options to a terrorist group, it would be foolish to say this limits the threat, yet it changes its implications. For example there could be no coordinated strike such as in 7/7 and the scope for a hijack by a single actor would be limited, especially in the wary world post 9/11. Yet bombings or coordinated chemical attacks are an option, it is important to remember that it does not have to be devastating (statistically not emotionally) to produce a response of terror. Posted chemicals (fake or deadly) or a small explosive device with limited power are still capable of inciting fear; a suicide attack no matter how limited in its effect would still cause a large feel of unease amongst a population who wish to believe their government and security services are capable of thwarting terrorism.

Lone terrorists should not be underestimated, Anders Breivik perpetrator of the 2011 Norway massacre is a prime example of what a ideologically driven individual is capable of. In this situation the selection of the right target (a packed but isolated location) and one of the simplest forms of attack (a weapon carried and operated by himself) lead to tragic and horrific circumstances.

There is a final consideration, the classification of an act by a lone terrorist. Would the press, police and government recognise a lone act as terrorism or try and move the act into a crime setting. Whilst both terrorism and crime are obviously linked let us consider that there is an obvious difference between acts of violent crime and acts of violent terror. A lone wolf could in theory be considered an actor of violent crime rather than terrorism. If one thinks of the many instances of lone gunmen, assassins or bombers in the USA it is only in recent years that they have received a terrorist slant. Previously the acts were blamed on loners, mad men with violent murderous streaks, despite the perpetrators’ having strong ideologies, zealous religious ideas or cult beliefs. The risk is two fold, either an act being upgraded to a terrorist action due to the evidence of strong ideologies or beliefs, or the opposite a terrorist not being identified due to a lack of evidence (especially if harder to trace due acting alone) and the act being considered the actions of a violent loner. In the current threat environment the former is more likely than the latter.

It must be remembered that it is hard to predict whether the individuals who may return to the UK are plotting to undertake terrorist acts or will go through with acts they plan. These individuals would certainly be harder to detect than the ‘terror cells’ which has dominated recent years; but there is time for identification and investigation of these individuals currently operation overseas. For an attack to achieve its maximum potential risks would have to be undertaken by the individual in the planning stage, it is here where the cover offered by working alone can be blown. Similarly the limiting factors of working alone can limit the options and even ultimately the resolve of an individual actor, unless they are willing to carry out a hands on devastating attack similar to Norway. These limitations could make any threat or act hopefully less likely or at worst, less effective. This is no excuse for complacency rather a hopeful outlook of the lone wolf’s limitations.