Wednesday 14 March 2012

The Power of the Strategic Corporal


Events in Afghanistan over the last few weeks have given prime examples of the dark side of the 'strategic corporal' theory; the idea that the actions of individuals of lower ranks on the ground affect the overall strategic perspective of a conflict zone. The burning of the Korans at the end of last month and the massacre committed by the lone soldier in Kandahar on Sunday contribute to the strategic picture faced by US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan far more than the actions and ideas of senior generals. Based on this theory a conflict zone essentially is shaped by two different strategic actors, the traditional grand strategy framework of army planners, policy makers, generals etc. and the real time strategic picture contributed by the actions of anyone on the 'frontline'. In ideal practise the element of the 'strategic corporals' is in line with and acting on behalf of the large policy based strategy element, yet as these recent events have shown there are increasing scenarios of when the strategic approach of the leaders has been damaged by the actions of soldiers on the business end of the campaign.

In historical reflection the 'strategic corporal' is not as new a concept as some would think, in recent history it is easy to think of the 'strategic lieutenant' in Vietnam, where platoon or company sized actions had the most immediate affect on the strategic picture of parts of the war zone. Earlier still small groups of men would affect the outcomes of skirmishes and battles throughout history if used correctly or tactically in the right place, these would usually be the product of prior planning yet some came from the quick thinking of men on the ground. However these contributed to the military strategic outcome and that is where the historical concept differs from the contemporary; that the actions of individuals in a conflict situation affect far more than just military victory or defeat.

The true idea of the 'strategic corporal' was coined by General Charles C. Krulak in the title of an article in Marines Magazine about the "Three Block War," an increasingly important arena of military operations defined by engagement with hostile, neutral and friendly forces, all at the same time, in a very geographically limited area. If used positively the idea suggests that the lowest ranked NCOs are directly influencing the conflict area on behalf of the main strategy. Though as seen recently the effects are equally as profound if they are acting irresponsibly.

Two sides of the strategic corporal.
 Above: on the ground directly winning hearts and minds.
Below: Marines urinating on Taliban corpses


The fact that a conflict such as Afghanistan has far more actors than just the US and enemy combatants means that the actions of a strategic corporal have far more bearing than they have ever had in history. The native population, media, allies, enemy forces, enemy sympathises, foreign observers and charities are all part of those initially affected by the actions of an individual or small group. This coupled with the speed of the modern media and social communication mean that a massacre such as Sunday has travelled round the world just as quickly as high strategic planners are trying to limit the backlash from such an event.

As such the overall strategic picture is dependent on the actions and image portrayed by the 'frontline' soldiers. It should not be forgotten that for the large amount of troops currently stationed in Afghanistan incidents remain rare, yet it only takes one or two to upset the fragile, if non existent stability that ISAF try to maintain. In a strange paradox of the current 'lone wolf' scenario that western planners continue to raise, the same can be seen in affecting the strategic picture that the US and its allies want to put forward, one that can easily be affected by the actions of one lone actor.

The questions now are concerned with exist dates and strategies, while it will be debated and guessed at by commentators and policy makers alike the bigger question is of course related to legacy. For any positive actions or strategic planning for stability, massacres, cultural misunderstandings or mistakes committed by individuals will undo them. It is for that reason that in modern conflict situations the strategic results are no longer primarily military and nor are they sole responsibility of planners and generals, in fact they have shifted to the soldiers who are exposed to the environment day in and day out. For that reason the importance of the 'strategic corporal' can not be underestimated, whether being utilised for success or in the worst case scenarios of mistakes and incidents.

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