Guest Blogger Harry Mill explores the question of justifiable torture.
This work
seeks to answer the question whether the torture of terrorist subjects can
really be justified. It is clear that a number of persuasive arguments present
themselves on either side of the debate; however it is the belief of this work
that to an extent, the torture of terrorist subjects can be justified but only
morally, never legally. In dealing with this question of morality, the work
will focus on the deontological argument versus the consequentialist, also
known as the utilitarian argument, supporting aspects of the consequentialist
argument. This work will seek to analyse the question through three defined
areas; the legality of torture, the morality of torture and the results of
torture. Finally this work will conclude its evaluation regarding the
justification of the torture of terrorist subjects.
The debate
regarding the justification of torture is not new, however it has been thrust
forward into public consciousness in the last decade due to the ongoing War on
Terror, the campaign waged by the United States and its international allies
against terrorist groups and non state actors that support terrorist activities
and seek to cause harm to those opposed to their cause. It is worth noting that
for this essay, it is the role of the US and not its allies that will be
analysed, with the actions of post 9/11 America and in particular the actions carried
out at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. The War on
Terror has been a conflict of selective interest, with key figures amongst the
American administration at the centre of this debate on whether the torture of
terrorist subjects can really be justified. Dick Cheney left no allusion to
this; ‘it’s going to be vital ... to use any means at our disposal, basically,
to achieve our objective [and to] work through...the dark side’ (Evangelista,
2009, p. 59).
In analysing
whether the torture of terrorist subjects really can be justified, it is
necessary to first define some key terms. For the purpose of this work, ‘torture’
will be defined as ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity (United Nations, 1984). This is the definition that is used
in the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture. For the purpose of this
work, morality will be seen as the principles concerning the distinction
between good and bad as well as right and wrong. Finally, when referring to
results, it will be taken that this refers to the outcomes and responses taken
against actions that have results. With these having been established, it is
now necessary to move onto the first part of the argument that supports the
statement of this work, that the torture of terrorist subjects can to a certain
extent be morally justified but not legally.
The
Legality of Torture
Torture in
all its forms is illegal. As Duffy clearly states ‘Torture, properly
understood, is prohibited absolutely, and states are obliged, inter alia, to prosecute those responsible’
(Duffy, 2005, p. 354). Both domestically and internationally there is no grey
area in which torture, whether by state or individual has any legal place. The
UN Convention Against Torture bluntly states this (United Nations, 1985). Since
the beginning of the War on Terror, in the days governed by fear and dominated
by the need to response in any way to the catastrophic attacks, the Bush Administration
has welcomed and acted upon a serious of memorandums and sets of legal advice
from the Office of Legal Council (OLC) that have flown in the face of this
absolute ban on torture, by seeking to circumvent legality by narrowing the
definitions of torture.
The infamous ‘Torture Memo’ (Goldsmith, 2007)
put forward by John Yoo of the OLC in 2002 in particular sought to redefine
torture. It stated that ‘the threshold for torture “must be equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily functions or even death” (Ignatieff, 2006).
Indeed anything below this was considered only coercive interrogation although
by law this should have been considered torture, rather than the warped idea of
‘torture lite’ (Ignatieff, 2006). Jack Goldsmith, then Assistant Attorney
General at the OLC commented that this memo gave those torturing individuals at
Guantanamo Bay the idea that ‘violent acts aren’t necessarily torture; if you
do torture, you probably have a defense; and if you don’t have a defense, the
torture law doesn’t apply to you if you act under colour of presidential
authority’ (Goldsmith, 2007). It was crucial that this abuse of the law, from
the top down, in trying to justify the torture of terrorist subjects be framed
in a certain way to give comfort to those breaking this moral and legal code.
Phillipe Sands reminds us however that regardless of your position, Prime
Minister or President, no one is above the law (Sands, 2005) no matter the
mitigating circumstances. The efforts by the Department of Defense in a 2003
memo stated that President Bush was not bound by any international treaties or
federal laws that prohibited torture, and that it was not prevented by constitutional
law (Harris, 2004), are indicative of this attempt by the US to oppose this.
This abuse
of the law by executive members of the Bush Administration, carried on by
members of the Obama administration indicates the level of contempt the US holds
for the international community. Indeed the US used Saddam Hussein’s use of
torture as part of its reason to invade Iraq in 2003, exclaiming its duty to
protect the human rights of others, while it sanctioned illegal torture itself
(Sands, 2008). The attempt to use the War on Terror as some kind of special
circumstance, and the efforts by Jay Bybee and John Yoo of the OLC in carefully
wording certain memo’s are key to this understanding. The abuses of detainees,
at Guantanamo and at Abu Ghraib flys in the face of military law, even though
there remain those in the US military who carry out such actions. FM 34-52
provides strict parameters through which interrogations can be conducted. The
2002 memo, signed by Secretary for Defense Rumsfled, suddenly granted new
levels of interrogation such as the infamous Waterboarding techniques and
physical beatings.
Heather
MacDonald offers up a ‘bottom-up’ assessment of crucial and sadistic torture at
Abu Ghraib. She claims that it was the inadequacy and frustration of the
military prison guards that led to the torture and humiliation of detainees
rather than the more widely accepted ‘top-down’ approach of supporting torture
through dubious and narrowly defined legal statements from the OLC
(Evangelista, 2009). It has since become
apparent that whilst MacDonald’s claim of frustration contributed to the scale
of abuse, it is clear that a policy of institutionalised torture was creeping
through the US military and intelligence services, at Guantanamo Bay and at Abu
Ghraib. The extent of the involvement of senior executive members of the White
House, such as Rumsfeld, was seen through the previously mentioned ‘torture
memo’ (Evangelista, 2009). Evidence of this is not only damning but worrying,
in the obvious belief by Bush and Rumsefld that the torture of terrorist
subjects was not only justified morally, but also legally. As Alfred W. McCoy
comments, ‘when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld interjected that there were
legal restraints on such action [torture], the President shouted back, ‘I don’t
care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass’ (McCoy,
2006, p. 113). Another clear example was the torture of Abu Zubayah, a detained
Al Qaeda member who was believed to have actionable intelligence regarding
further attacks against the US. It is worth nothing however that the best
information that was extracted from Zubayah came not from the CIA – the main
propagators of torture. The FBI, which arguably remained opposed to the
policies of torture alongside most of the military, extracted the intelligence
through standard FBI interrogation, using tried and tested interrogation
techniques as opposed to torture, or coercive interrogation as some might
legally try to argue. This is a theme that will be addressed further later on
with regards to the results of torture. It is worth nothing that ‘with the
military and the FBI, much opposition [to the practices of torture] was based
on moral revulsion and reluctance to break the law’ (Evangelista, 2009, p. 81).
Many have
questioned the decisions made by the US administrations in detaining and
torturing individuals at Guantanamo Bay and at Abu Ghraib in Cuba and Iraq
respectively. The reason for doing so is clear; it removes the individual from
US territory and therefore removes the law and rights which apply to those on
US soil (Steyn, 2004). The extraordinary rendition and the thinking behind the
decision indicates the lengths that the US will go to in trying to avoid
international law, and the effort it has put into breaking international law. While
torture is one thing, the positioning of individuals in areas where torture has
a better chance of avoiding prosecution indicates the level of responsibility(Raustiala,
2009), and once again indicates the top down approach to torture that is
central to the US War on Terror.
There
remains a key question that these adapted aspects of US law have tried to
address; at what point does interrogation stop and torture begins? By wording
the 2002 torture memo and the 2003 memo giving powers to use increased methods
of ‘coercive interrogation’ (Ignatieff, 2006) specifically, it is clear that
the US sees the idea of coercive interrogation (torture to the rest of the
world) as legally acceptable. It is of course, still in complete violation of
the UN Convention against Torture, and in most cases the Geneva Convention
(Roberts, 2007). Britain and Israel were charged with degrading and inhuman
treatment of detainees but not of torture indicating that there is a practical
difference between the two. Thus there must be a moral acceptance of coercive
interrogation that does not cross any legal or moral boundary. It is the fact
that torture is so narrowly defined by the US in its delineation of the end of
coercive interrogation and the start of torture that is its undoing. It offers
such an expansive array of actions in coercive torture that other nations can
only see it as torture. Had it perhaps, added further legal safeguards, more
than just the agreement of the Secretarty of Defense then there is a remote
possibility that the broader definitions of torture, and the narrower
definitions of coercive interrogation may have resulted in both a moral and
legal acceptance on the international stage. This remains a remote idea. Further
issues arise, as Tom Parker states, in that interrogators cannot be trusted to
heed the distinction between coercive interrogation and torture (Anonymous,
2010). So far, this work has seen evidence that the torture of terrorist
subjects is illegal regardless of the moves made by the Bush Administration
with the basis of this answer having been legally addressed. It is now
necessary to move onto the morality of torture in continuing the evaluation and
support of the statement of this work, that the torture of terrorist subjects
can be morally justified to a certain extent, but never legally justified.
The Morality of Torture
The morality
of torture is much debated and rightly so. As this work has already accepted in
accordance with international law, torture is illegal. There remains a
difference between legality and morality, and it is this which is key in
assessing whether the torture of terrorist subjects really can be justified.
When asked initially, whether torture is right or wrong, the majority of people
would say it is wrong, indeed it is for many ‘the deepest and most fundamental
liberal taboo’ (Ramsay, 2006, p. 103). But when represented with the most
common of arguments, the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ the majority would suddenly
accept that, in a specific situation, torture may be morally acceptable. Some
have descried this situational ethic as morality by numbers; pain for one, but
safety for the majority.
Three main
camps lie in this moral discussion between the deontological and
consequentialist arguments. First there is the absolutist, or deontological,
position – that under no circumstances can torture ever be committed, and it is
both legally and morally wrong, in all aspects. A supporter of this camp is Dr.
Mary Strauss (Galipeau, 2005). Her argument is founded on four key
understandings; ‘the inefficacy of torture, alternative investigative
techniques, the negative impact of torture use on society, and the likelihood
of increased resort to torture’ (Galipeau, 2005, p. 5). Another keen supporter
of this is Maureen Ramsay, who comments that ‘this absolute ban reflects the
Kantian idea that there are acts which are wrong in themselves regardless of
any good consequences’ (Ramsay, 2011, p. 627). For many, this seems morally
untenable, as it offers no exceptional circumstances under which torture may be
conducted, such as the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario. It also seems less realistic
and more of a liberal ideal. There is no doubting that torture, although
illegal exists in the world. While rather blunt, there is the argument that as
several nations use it, it must be effective on some occasions, if not
effective on all, however morally dubious it is.
Secondly, introducing
the consequentialist arguments, there is the concept of ‘Torture Warrants’ as
put forward by Alan Derschowitz (Dershowitz, 2002). Dershowitz advocates the idea that while
torture remains illegal and morally questionable, there is a greater moral duty
to those who might be saved through information gained under torture. In making
this acceptable, and in pursuit of minimising the amount of torture used, he
suggests that ‘Torture Warrants’ may be obtained by legal consent in extreme
circumstances. These are supposed to bring a certain level of not only
justification to torture, but to also add a level of transparency and
accountability to these proceedings. He claims that ‘it is better to control
and regulate torture with accountability, record keeping, standards and limits,
than to denounce torture but to tolerate extra-legal actions’ (Ramsay, 2006,
p.108) Judge Richard Posner is a supporter of this idea, citing the idea of a
ticking nuclear bomb in Times Square as the scenario when it is almost an
individual’s responsibility to torture someone if there is the hope of stopping
the device (Anonymous, 2010). All that happens however is that the decision to
cross the moral and legal boundaries is taken out of the hands of the torturer
and placed in the hands of a judge, which morally distances the torturer from
the act. The concept of a priori approval is worrying as it creates a climate of moral
acceptance in the case of torture (Ramsay, 2006). This is the start of a slide
towards institutionalised and politically and legally ratified torture, and as
David Cole states, the torture of the few leads to the torture of the many and
in doing this, ‘you end up going down a slippery slope and sanctioning torture
in general’ (McCoy, 2006, p.195).
Finally,
there is the concept of Walzer’s ‘Dirty Hands’ (Walzer, 1973). Based on
Machiavellian ethics, it is the idea that the lesser moral evil can be put
aside to combat a greater moral evil (De Wijze, 2006). Key to this concept is
that at no point is torture legalised or sanctioned in any way. It is up to an
individual, Walzer’s Tragic Hero, to take it upon them to go above and beyond
the call of moral duty. Oren Gross, a key supporter of this concept refers to
this as pragmatic absolutism and official disobedience (Galipeau, 2005). Gross
argues, a view supported by this work, that unlike Dershowitz’s concept of a
conditional ban, there must be absolute ban on torture legally, and it is the
only correct moral and legal course (Galipeau, 2005). He supports the idea that
in some cases the final resort may be defensible, the concept of pragmatic
absolutism, and this as a result of this government officials may find it
necessary to break the law, the concept of official disobedience (Galipeau, 2005).
This is done so in the knowledge that this is unlawful, but in the hope that a
level of acceptance may follow, and the Tragic Hero may find some reprieve. This
concept recognises the illegality of torture, recognises the moral dilemma of
torture, and indeed supports the view that torture is morally wrong, yet it
also keeps open a loophole of moral values that there may be a greater moral
evil than torture – the mass murder of innocents. By relying on ex post justification, there is no
passing of the moral responsibility onto a legal figure such as a judge – it
remains on the conscience of the individual who conducted the official
disobedience and became Walzer’s Tragic Hero with ‘dirty hands’. Gross states
that ‘the public official is required to balance the absolute ban on torture
against the perceived need to take extralegal action in order to prevent the
catastrophic event (Galipeau, 2005, p.11).
Ramsay, in
the discussion of Walzer, argues that while the ends may justify the means in
that it has achieved some good, in this case a level of information that
prevents a future deadly terrorist attack, it is still morally wrong (Ramsay,
2006). Ramsay then goes on to discuss Walzer’s Machiavellian and Weberian types
of individual, noting that the colder Machiavellian ‘simply throws away
morality for the good results that will be achieved’ (Ramsey, 2006, p.111), whereas
the Weberian political actor is ‘a tragic hero, who is horribly aware that he
is doing bad in order to achieve good and that in doing so he surrenders his
soul’ (Ramsay, 2006, p.111). It is this moral calculation, deciding whether one
accepts the moral consequences or ignore them, that separates the two and is
critical in understanding whether there is any justification in the torture of
terrorist subjects. It seems that once you have passed a boundary, whether it
is legal or moral, there is no turning back,. It falls to an individual to
provide the ends, which justify the means, and then it is up to this
individual, Walzer’s Tragic Hero (Ramsay, 2006) to shoulder the moral weight of
their own actions. There is a real risk that in turning from legal limits and
relying on moral ones, that torture may become institutionalised. The reliance
upon one political actor to cross the line and to act illegally, immorally but
for a greater good is an excellent way for an institution to use torture but wash
its hands of the act itself; to remain in support of torture as an illegal
activity, but to turn a blind eye in bringing those amongst its ranks to
justice in perpetrating the actual act of torturing someone (Ramsay, 2006).
While there
is general acceptance that torture is morally repugnant, it is also clear that
moral choices involving the lives of others, innocents, are able to balance out
the morality of the torturers actions. As this work has previously stated,
there is no legal justification for the torture of terrorist subjects. There is
however an excellent case as presented by Walzer for the moral acceptance of
torture as justification of terrorist subjects, if it prevents greater evil.
The arguments denouncement of torture, support of its illegality, and notion of
official disobedience is what separates it from the other consequentialist
argument put forward by Dershowitz and which debunks the out dated moral
absolutism put forward by Strauss and Ramsay.
It is this argument that provides the basis of the answer and the weight
behind the statement of this work, that the torture of terrorist subject can be
to an extent morally justified, but never legally. This work must now look at
the final aspect of deciding whether the torture of terrorist subjects can
really be justified; the results that torture, or the lack of, presents.
The Results of Torture
Having
previously looked at both the legality and morality that surrounds the debate
regarding torture, and in particular whether the torture of terrorist subject
can really be justified, it is now necessary to look at the results of torture.
Rather than providing the US with a wealth of actionable intelligence, there
have been little clear gains or major plots averted thanks to the use of
illegal torture, and the sacrifice of moral values (Anonymous, 2010). Other
than this however, there are other negative results of torture. There are two
main areas of this within the confines of torture results; the intelligence
gained through torture and its use, and the international and strategic
consequence of torture that the US then has to cope with.
Investigating
the intelligence procured under torture, there are a number of worrying results
that indicate that there is little justification in torturing terrorist subjects.
It is this lack of information obtained and the criticism of many regarding the
use of torture that signals most of all the unnecessary use of torture. FM
34-52, the US Army’s interrogation manual is blunt in its evaluation of torture
or coercive interrogation; ‘the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields
unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce
the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear’ (Sands,
2005, p.209).
There is
evidence which strongly supports the belief that torture brings about little in
the way of actionable intelligence and material and which therefore undermines
the argument that there is a justification in torturing terrorist subjects. A
former high level CIA operator stated that ‘ninety percent of the information
was unreliable’ (Evangelista, 2009, p. 83) when asked about the information
extracted under torture. US journalist Ron Susskind reported that ‘the best
information that came out of the captive may have resulted from nonviolent
methods of interrogation’ (Evangelista, 2009, p. 85) a position that was
supported by a 325 page report by the US Intelligence Science Board in 2006
(Evangelista, 2009). This is also supported by the findings of the US military
with regard to the information gathered from detainees. Chris Miller, whose
operated during the initial days of Operation Enduring Freedom stated that ‘one
of our biggest successes in Afghanistan…came when a valuable prisoner decided
to cooperate not because he had been abused…but precisely because he realized
he would not be tortured’ (Galipeau, 2005, p. 5).
Worryingly,
it is not certain that each time the US tortures someone they are torturing a
terrorist. This level of uncertainty should not be left to one side. Instead it
should be a critical factor in the evaluation of torture as unjust. The torture
of an innocent individual who happens to have been in the wrong place at the
wrong time, by a state that is hell bend on seeing results and extracting a
level of revenge on its enemies is a
huge miscarriage of justice. General Richard B. Myers, then the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff stated with regard to the initial detainees that were
sent to Guantanamo Bay, that ‘these are people who would gnaw through hydraulic
lines at the back of a C-17 (aircraft) to bring it down’ (Chatterjee, 2011),
however it has been proved that this is not always the case. Indeed Chatterjee
goes on to state that ‘almost one in five’ (Chatterjee, 2011) at Guantanamo Bay
had no connection to terrorism.
This ever
present fear of mistaken identity, that an innocent man may be tortured simply
as he has the same name as a target should be more central to policy decisions.
the decision to pay for supposed members of the Taliban and al Qaeda led to
many local men being old to the US for cash (Ramsay, 2006). Likewise there is
the issue that evidence obtained under duress, such as torture, is not
permissible in Civilian Courts. This has led to a worrying rise in the US of using
Military Tribunals to try and commit detainees.
Secondly, is
it necessary to take into account how far reaching the acts of torture have
upon the US. By committing morally repugnant acts such as torture, regardless
of the situation, it is almost guaranteed that the US will polarise its
support, domestically and internationally. For each nation that supports the
actions, another will oppose them. This weakens the international standing of
the US, undermining alliances, partnerships and willingness to aid the US. It
is also seen as a rally call to those who would combat the US such as foreign
fighters supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan – it aids the propaganda machine
of those it wishes to fight in the War on Terror (Roberts, 2007). As Ramsay
states, revelations of torture and systematic ill-treatment of prisoners have
intensified the crisis in American relations with the Muslim world and acted as
a rallying cry to a new generation of terrorist (Ramsay, 2006, p.113). It also
goes a way to strengthen the resolve of the extremists. While initially, it may
seem that through torture, the US can gain the upper hand, in the long run it
may ultimately be its undoing (Ramsay, 2006). Domestic support for the Bush Administration
plummeted, and support for the Obama Administration has taken a hit regarding
the continued illegal torture of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and Iraq.
Ultimately, with failing support, and the growing resolve of extremists against
the acts perpetrated by the US, there is a risk that consequentially, these
prove to be counterproductive acts.
Put bluntly,
there is little that favours torture as a campaign winning pro-security move.
It benefits the opposition too much, radicalising nations and groups arrayed
against the US (Anonymous, 2010), risks repayment in kind against US forces and
civilians, has proved ineffective against the resolve of extremists, and has
tainted or provided falsehoods in any information extracted (Anonymous, 2010).
Time and again, traditional interrogation, and ultimately empty threats of
torture, have, as previously shown, given the US the information it needs
without crossing any legal or moral boundary.
Conclusion
There is no
doubting that the War on Terror is different to any previous conflict. This
however does not ultimately pardon the US Administration which have perpetrated
illegal torture and detainment of individuals, guilty or not. This work has
stated throughout, in response to the question of whether the torture of
terrorist subjects can be justified, that while the torture of terrorist
subjects can be morally justified to an extent, there is no legal
justification. This work has used evaluations of legal, moral and resulting
arguments in order to provide a basis for this answer. Evaluation of the
results and resulting actions that have affected the US also support the
argument against justification of torture. Indeed, this work does not support
the torture of terrorist subjects, but it must be made clear that a position of
moral absolutism is not the way forward. It is necessary in this contemporary
climate to be prepared to commit official disobedience (Galipeau, 2005), to
carry out the unpalatable acts of torture in order to support a greater moral
standing and duty to the cause. There may be no long term gains, and as always,
torture remains illegal, but there must be an acceptance that rarely, an
individual must perform the unacceptable, in order to support the greater good.
Bibliography
Anonymous.
2010. ‘Torture can Never be Justified’, Intelligence2 [online] [Accessed on 16 April 2010] Available from www.intelligencesquared.com/_.../intelligence-squared-Controvery-Torture-can-never-be-justified.pdf
Branche, R.
2007. ‘Torture of Terrorist? Use of Torture in a ‘War against Terrorism’:
Justification, Methods and Effects: The Case of France in Algeria, 1954-1962’, International Review of the Red Cross. 89 (867, September) pp. 543 - 560
Chatterjee.
P. 2011. ‘Wikileaks File Reveal Failures of US Intelligence’, Inter Press Service News Agency [online]
[Accessed on 29 April 2011] Available from http://ipsnews.net/text/news.asp?idnews=55422
Danner,M. 2009. ‘US Torture. Voices from the Black Sites’. New York Review of Books [online] [Accessed 16 April 2011]
Available from http://www.hybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/apr/09/us-torture-voices-from-the-black-sites/?pagination.pt
De Wijze, S.
2006. ‘Torture and
Liberalism’, Democratiya (7) Winter. pp.10-36
Dershowitz,
A. M. 2002. Why Terrorism Works:
Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press
Duffy, H.
2005, The ‘War on Terror’ and the
Framework of international Law. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press
Evangelista,
M. 2009. Law, Ethics, and the War on
Terror. Cambridge: Polity Press
Galipeau, D.
A. 2005. Torture and the War on
Terrorism: Time the Think the Unthinkable? Carlise Barracks, Pennsylvania:
U.S Army War College
Goldsmith, J. 2007. The Terror Presidency :Law and Judgment
inside the Bush Administration. New York: W. W. Norton
Harris, S.
2004. ‘Interview with Michael Ratner’, Between
the Lines. [online] Broadcast 25 June 2004 [Accessed 29 April 2011]
Available from http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0406/S00202.htm
Ignatieff, M. 2006. ‘If Torture Works…’ Prospect Magazine (April) [online]
[Accessed on 27 April 2011] Available from http://www.david-kilgour.com/2008/Dec_14_2008_05_.php
McCoy, A. W.
2006. A Question of Torture: CIA
Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York: Holt
Paperbacks
Miller, S.
2005. ‘Is Torture Ever Morally Justifiable?’, International Journal of Applied Philosophy. 19 (2) pp. 179 - 192
ParryJ. T. 2005. “Just for Fun”: Understanding Torture
and Understanding Abu Ghraib’, Journal of
National Security Law and Policy [online] 1, pp. 253 -284 [Accessed 24 April 2011] Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=806007
Ramsay, M.
2011, ‘Dirty Hands or Dirty Decisions? Investigating, Prosecuting and Punishing
those responsible for abuses of Detainees in Counter Terrorism Operations’, The International Journal of Human Rights.
15 (4, May) pp. 627-643
Ramsay, M.
2006. ‘Can the Torture of Terrorist Suspects be Justified?’ The International Journal of Human Rights.
10 (2) pp. 103-119
Raustiala, K. 2009. ‘Offshoring the war on terror’ in,
K. Raustiala, Does the constitution follow the flag? : the evolution of
territoriality in American law . pp.187-221. Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Roberts, A. 2007. ‘Torture and Incompetence in the
'War on Terror', Survival.
49(1) Spring. pp. 199-212
Sands, P. 2005. Lawless
World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules. London: Allen
Lane
Sands, P. 2008. Torture
Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan
Steyn, J.
2004. ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53 (1, January), pp. 1-15
United
Nations. 1984. UN Convention Against and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, pt. 1, art. 1 [online]
[Accessed on 16 April 2011] Available from http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html
Wagner, M.
2003. ‘The Justification of Torture.
Some Remarks on Alan M. Dershowitz's Why Terrorism Works’, German Law Journal 4 pp.
515-526
Walzer, M.
1973. ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs. 2. pp. 160-180
Yoo, J.
2006.War by Other Means: An Insider’s
Account of the War on Terror. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press
