Lessons Learned? - Introduction

On viewing the brilliant BBC documentary; Afghanistan: The Great Game - A Personal View by Rory Stewart I  was compelled to think deeper about the nature of learning from previous military conflicts.

This has lead to me sharing several observations that I have investigated academically over the last 2 years, firstly an overall examination into the nature of military lessons (Lessons Learned) and secondly a more specific investigation into learning from previous counterinsurgencies in support of contemporary strategies (How Counterinsurgents Learn). Finally I offer an historical perspective and conclusion.

It is an often quoted adage that we ignore previous lessons, experiences and history at our peril. Certainly the view presented by Rory Stewart in the Afghanistan context points to this; British, Soviet Union, US and coalition forces making similar mistakes over the course of 170 years of warfare. A counter argument suggests we can draw conclusions to quickly in discovering similarities, an even more critical approach could suggest that previous failures drive military and government to attempts to overcome problems which themselves, allies and enemies have previously failed.

Does this mean that governments and military planners will continually make mistakes which historical evidence could of helped avoid, or are conflicts separate entities to be viewed as individual events separate from previous and future similarities. I hope the following essays will shed some light, both theoretically and in direct reference to contemporary events.

Letters from Abbottabad; Osama bin Laden's Correspondence

Thursday saw the the publishing of Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? a selection of the documents seized in the raid which ended Osama bin Laden's life. The writings, a selection from the cache of over 6000 taken, point to the frustrations of trying to control a fractioned terrorist organisation.




The specific documents which will have been carefully chosen to ensure the right message is portrayed around the anniversary of Bin Laden's assassination; one of a crippled leader with dwindling influence, but still capable of inspiring deadly acts of terrorism; thus legitimising the operation undertaken to kill him.




The documents hint at a difference of vision between Bin Laden and his successor  Ayman al Zawahiri, CNN Terrorist  Analyst  Paul Cruickshank's suggests that 'Bin Laden, who had previously played the role of chief executive in al Qaeda, was cast in the role of a meddling chairman, micro-managing and second guessing al Yazeed and al Atiyah’s decision making from afar, while Zawahiri was cast into the role of a senior board member, providing advice and input into the terror network’s decision-making whenever he could get messages through to the operational commanders.' [1] Strategic differences were present in their vision, with Zawahiri favouring attacks on US interests in the Afghanistan theatre and on US Middle East interests, with Bin Laden still wanting attacks on the US homeland. Interestingly a public statement issued by al Zawahiri on the Arab spring is seen in edited form in one of the letters found in the compound, of the 12 proposed corrections only one appears in al-Zawahiri’s speech.

Furthermore some of the documents released are letters received by Bin Laden, including suggestions of , strategic failures, mergers with other groups,name changes for Al-Qaeda and the idea of Jihad repulsing many Muslims.These coupled with mistakes Bin Laden himself acknowledges, add to the image of a man grappling with failures he has limited influence over. It is impossible to know whether the correspondence reached their intended recipient, and the documents frequently mention lack of communication from other groups. 

Whilst the letters suggest the difficulties of leadership, faced by Bin Laden, exiled and in hiding in his Pakistani safe house; there still is plenty of evidence that he was still an effective strategic planner and monitor of world events. He Falsely saw the Arab spring as evidence of the Arab worlds rebellion against American influence 'What we are witnessing these days of consecutive revolutions is a great and glorious event, and it is most probable, according to reality and history, that it will encompass the majority of the Islamic world with the will of Allah, and thanks to Allah things are strongly heading towards the exit of Muslims from being under the control of America,' [2]. 

The same letter suggest responses to how Al Qaeda should react to the changes sweeping the Arab world, yet it also shows how the leader would suggest terrorist actions, such as hostage taking down to the smallest consideration. 'As far as the French hostages with our brothers in the Islamic Maghreb, I want to warn that the atmosphere after the French standing towards the Libyan people does not condone killing the French, due to what will follow of negative reflections, after it became evident that most of the common people are supporting Sarkozy, so if we need to kill them then that should be after the end of Libyan events' [3] continuing to suggest timing any action with the french elections. 


The document, incidentally Bin Laden's last, dated 26th April 2011; a week before his death, shows his wide interest in the overall scope of operations around the Middle East; suggesting further jihadist actions in Afghanistan, requesting information on actions in Iraq, on Brothers coming from Iran, hostage taking in Somalia as well as the overall need to insight further revolution in the Arab world. In his both ideas and requests for further information he seems to still be both well informed and capable of making suggestions which would affect the tactical and strategic actions of Al Qaeda.

It is interesting from a British perspective that, in a letter  discussing the focus on the US as a tree that needs felling it is important not to get distracted by smaller branches such as the UK; 'Assume that we have cut up 30cm of the trunk of that tree. We,then, see an opportunity to use our saw to cut into one of the branches. Say a branch that represents the United Kingdom. We should ignore that opportunity, and to go back to sawing the trunk of the tree.' [4]. It compares attacking the USA like attacking the Soviet Union in the 1980s, destroying the main body of its interests lead to the collapse of the whole USSR.

 The documents also highlight:

• Bin ladens strategic use of the media, citing the need to broadcast messages via Al-Jeezera in coincidence with the 10th anniversary of 9/11.

• The fear of Drones and the need for higher security measures to prevent Al-Qaeda operatives being targeted by them. (so much so that one letter instructed on the use of tunnels for meetings, the need for precise timings and decoy cars.)

• The order to create suicide squads to target President Obama and General Petraeus 

• The strategic planning to create change in US Policy by not targeting key figures such as Vice President Joe Biden "Biden is totally unprepared for that post (the presidency), which will lead the U.S. into a crisis,"  [5].

• Strategic and Tactical considerations for groups operating in various areas to ensure that there was reduced infighting between groups.

• Tactical considerations for suicide bombers, such as operating in pairs due to the psychological stress of the action.

• Views on other groups actions as well as strategic considerations involving Muslim civilians, various countries and the overall nature and image of Al-Qaeda 

Overall the letters confirm what was already predicted of Bin Laden's  final few years in hiding; a man who still had grand strategic visions yet was limited in his ability to convey these ideas to the organisation he headed. Rifts in vision with other senior members may hint at the the direction Al Qaeda may be taking after his death. The very fact that Bin Laden had become so isolated may point that his death was not as damaging to Al Qaeda as the US may have hoped. Yet whilst the exile may have reduced his abilities of leadership it is safe to assume from evidence within the published documents that in removing the man who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks, not only was revenge achieved but that also a key strategic thinker, adviser and visionary  was removed from the top position of Al Qaeda.

1. Bin Laden documents: Competing vision of Al Qaeda’s top two, By Paul Cruickshank, CNN Terrorism Analyst may 7th 2012
2.  Letters from Abbottabad: SOCOM - 2012 0000010
3.  Ibid
4.  SOCOM-2012-0000017-HT
5.  Bin Laden documents: The plotting continued, By Mike Mount May 3rd 2012

The Hunt for Bin Laden (TV Show)

It seems a picked a bad time to have a break from blogging, the last month has been filled with important events that have contributed to our understanding of the security and international relations world. From heightened police responses in London, Border security issues at Heathrow, and renewed tension in Egypt and Syrian it has been a busy month in the security world. 


I would first like to recommend the ITV documentary The Hunt for Bin Laden an insightful and interesting programme not only examining the final action of his killing, but also going back to review the long standing man hunt and investigation into the notorious terrorist.

http://www.itv.com/itvplayer/video/?Filter=315836

The Power of the Strategic Corporal

Events in Afghanistan over the last few weeks have given prime examples of the dark side of the 'strategic corporal' theory; the idea that the actions of individuals of lower ranks on the ground affect the overall strategic perspective of a conflict zone. The burning of the Korans at the end of last month and the massacre committed by the lone soldier in Kandahar on Sunday contribute to the strategic picture faced by US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan far more than the actions and ideas of senior generals. Based on this theory a conflict zone essentially is shaped by two different strategic actors, the traditional grand strategy framework of army planners, policy makers, generals etc. and the real time strategic picture contributed by the actions of anyone on the 'frontline'. In ideal practise the element of the 'strategic corporals' is in line with and acting on behalf of the large policy based strategy element, yet as these recent events have shown there are increasing scenarios of when the strategic approach of the leaders has been damaged by the actions of soldiers on the business end of the campaign.

In historical reflection the 'strategic corporal' is not as new a concept as some would think, in recent history it is easy to think of the 'strategic lieutenant' in Vietnam, where platoon or company sized actions had the most immediate affect on the strategic picture of parts of the war zone. Earlier still small groups of men would affect the outcomes of skirmishes and battles throughout history if used correctly or tactically in the right place, these would usually be the product of prior planning yet some came from the quick thinking of men on the ground. However these contributed to the military strategic outcome and that is where the historical concept differs from the contemporary; that the actions of individuals in a conflict situation affect far more than just military victory or defeat.

The true idea of the 'strategic corporal' was coined by General Charles C. Krulak in the title of an article in Marines Magazine about the "Three Block War," an increasingly important arena of military operations defined by engagement with hostile, neutral and friendly forces, all at the same time, in a very geographically limited area. If used positively the idea suggests that the lowest ranked NCOs are directly influencing the conflict area on behalf of the main strategy. Though as seen recently the effects are equally as profound if they are acting irresponsibly.

Two sides of the strategic corporal.
 Above: on the ground directly winning hearts and minds.
Below: Marines urinating on Taliban corpses

The fact that a conflict such as Afghanistan has far more actors than just the US and enemy combatants means that the actions of a strategic corporal have far more bearing than they have ever had in history. The native population, media, allies, enemy forces, enemy sympathises, foreign observers and charities are all part of those initially affected by the actions of an individual or small group. This coupled with the speed of the modern media and social communication mean that a massacre such as Sunday has travelled round the world just as quickly as high strategic planners are trying to limit the backlash from such an event.

As such the overall strategic picture is dependent on the actions and image portrayed by the 'frontline' soldiers. It should not be forgotten that for the large amount of troops currently stationed in Afghanistan incidents remain rare, yet it only takes one or two to upset the fragile, if non existent stability that ISAF try to maintain. In a strange paradox of the current 'lone wolf' scenario that western planners continue to raise, the same can be seen in affecting the strategic picture that the US and its allies want to put forward, one that can easily be affected by the actions of one lone actor.

The questions now are concerned with exist dates and strategies, while it will be debated and guessed at by commentators and policy makers alike the bigger question is of course related to legacy. For any positive actions or strategic planning for stability, massacres, cultural misunderstandings or mistakes committed by individuals will undo them. It is for that reason that in modern conflict situations the strategic results are no longer primarily military and nor are they sole responsibility of planners and generals, in fact they have shifted to the soldiers who are exposed to the environment day in and day out. For that reason the importance of the 'strategic corporal' can not be underestimated, whether being utilised for success or in the worst case scenarios of mistakes and incidents.