Can The Torture of Terrorist Subjects Really Be Justified? -- By Guest Blogger Harry Mill

Guest Blogger Harry Mill explores the question of justifiable torture.

This work seeks to answer the question whether the torture of terrorist subjects can really be justified. It is clear that a number of persuasive arguments present themselves on either side of the debate; however it is the belief of this work that to an extent, the torture of terrorist subjects can be justified but only morally, never legally. In dealing with this question of morality, the work will focus on the deontological argument versus the consequentialist, also known as the utilitarian argument, supporting aspects of the consequentialist argument. This work will seek to analyse the question through three defined areas; the legality of torture, the morality of torture and the results of torture. Finally this work will conclude its evaluation regarding the justification of the torture of terrorist subjects.

The debate regarding the justification of torture is not new, however it has been thrust forward into public consciousness in the last decade due to the ongoing War on Terror, the campaign waged by the United States and its international allies against terrorist groups and non state actors that support terrorist activities and seek to cause harm to those opposed to their cause. It is worth noting that for this essay, it is the role of the US and not its allies that will be analysed, with the actions of post 9/11 America and in particular the actions carried out at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. The War on Terror has been a conflict of selective interest, with key figures amongst the American administration at the centre of this debate on whether the torture of terrorist subjects can really be justified. Dick Cheney left no allusion to this; ‘it’s going to be vital ... to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective [and to] work through...the dark side’ (Evangelista, 2009, p. 59).

In analysing whether the torture of terrorist subjects really can be justified, it is necessary to first define some key terms. For the purpose of this work, ‘torture’ will be defined as ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted upon a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person  has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity (United Nations, 1984). This is the definition that is used in the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture. For the purpose of this work, morality will be seen as the principles concerning the distinction between good and bad as well as right and wrong. Finally, when referring to results, it will be taken that this refers to the outcomes and responses taken against actions that have results. With these having been established, it is now necessary to move onto the first part of the argument that supports the statement of this work, that the torture of terrorist subjects can to a certain extent be morally justified but not legally.

The Legality of Torture

Torture in all its forms is illegal. As Duffy clearly states ‘Torture, properly understood, is prohibited absolutely, and states are obliged, inter alia, to prosecute those responsible’ (Duffy, 2005, p. 354). Both domestically and internationally there is no grey area in which torture, whether by state or individual has any legal place. The UN Convention Against Torture bluntly states this (United Nations, 1985). Since the beginning of the War on Terror, in the days governed by fear and dominated by the need to response in any way to the catastrophic attacks, the Bush Administration has welcomed and acted upon a serious of memorandums and sets of legal advice from the Office of Legal Council (OLC) that have flown in the face of this absolute ban on torture, by seeking to circumvent legality by narrowing the definitions of torture.

 The infamous ‘Torture Memo’ (Goldsmith, 2007) put forward by John Yoo of the OLC in 2002 in particular sought to redefine torture. It stated that ‘the threshold for torture “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily functions or even death” (Ignatieff, 2006). Indeed anything below this was considered only coercive interrogation although by law this should have been considered torture, rather than the warped idea of ‘torture lite’ (Ignatieff, 2006). Jack Goldsmith, then Assistant Attorney General at the OLC commented that this memo gave those torturing individuals at Guantanamo Bay the idea that ‘violent acts aren’t necessarily torture; if you do torture, you probably have a defense; and if you don’t have a defense, the torture law doesn’t apply to you if you act under colour of presidential authority’ (Goldsmith, 2007). It was crucial that this abuse of the law, from the top down, in trying to justify the torture of terrorist subjects be framed in a certain way to give comfort to those breaking this moral and legal code. Phillipe Sands reminds us however that regardless of your position, Prime Minister or President, no one is above the law (Sands, 2005) no matter the mitigating circumstances. The efforts by the Department of Defense in a 2003 memo stated that President Bush was not bound by any international treaties or federal laws that prohibited torture, and that it was not prevented by constitutional law (Harris, 2004), are indicative of this attempt by the US to oppose this.

This abuse of the law by executive members of the Bush Administration, carried on by members of the Obama administration indicates the level of contempt the US holds for the international community. Indeed the US used Saddam Hussein’s use of torture as part of its reason to invade Iraq in 2003, exclaiming its duty to protect the human rights of others, while it sanctioned illegal torture itself (Sands, 2008). The attempt to use the War on Terror as some kind of special circumstance, and the efforts by Jay Bybee and John Yoo of the OLC in carefully wording certain memo’s are key to this understanding. The abuses of detainees, at Guantanamo and at Abu Ghraib flys in the face of military law, even though there remain those in the US military who carry out such actions. FM 34-52 provides strict parameters through which interrogations can be conducted. The 2002 memo, signed by Secretary for Defense Rumsfled, suddenly granted new levels of interrogation such as the infamous Waterboarding techniques and physical beatings. 

Heather MacDonald offers up a ‘bottom-up’ assessment of crucial and sadistic torture at Abu Ghraib. She claims that it was the inadequacy and frustration of the military prison guards that led to the torture and humiliation of detainees rather than the more widely accepted ‘top-down’ approach of supporting torture through dubious and narrowly defined legal statements from the OLC (Evangelista, 2009).  It has since become apparent that whilst MacDonald’s claim of frustration contributed to the scale of abuse, it is clear that a policy of institutionalised torture was creeping through the US military and intelligence services, at Guantanamo Bay and at Abu Ghraib. The extent of the involvement of senior executive members of the White House, such as Rumsfeld, was seen through the previously mentioned ‘torture memo’ (Evangelista, 2009). Evidence of this is not only damning but worrying, in the obvious belief by Bush and Rumsefld that the torture of terrorist subjects was not only justified morally, but also legally. As Alfred W. McCoy comments, ‘when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld interjected that there were legal restraints on such action [torture], the President shouted back, ‘I don’t care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass’ (McCoy, 2006, p. 113). Another clear example was the torture of Abu Zubayah, a detained Al Qaeda member who was believed to have actionable intelligence regarding further attacks against the US. It is worth nothing however that the best information that was extracted from Zubayah came not from the CIA – the main propagators of torture. The FBI, which arguably remained opposed to the policies of torture alongside most of the military, extracted the intelligence through standard FBI interrogation, using tried and tested interrogation techniques as opposed to torture, or coercive interrogation as some might legally try to argue. This is a theme that will be addressed further later on with regards to the results of torture. It is worth nothing that ‘with the military and the FBI, much opposition [to the practices of torture] was based on moral revulsion and reluctance to break the law’ (Evangelista, 2009, p. 81).

Many have questioned the decisions made by the US administrations in detaining and torturing individuals at Guantanamo Bay and at Abu Ghraib in Cuba and Iraq respectively. The reason for doing so is clear; it removes the individual from US territory and therefore removes the law and rights which apply to those on US soil (Steyn, 2004). The extraordinary rendition and the thinking behind the decision indicates the lengths that the US will go to in trying to avoid international law, and the effort it has put into breaking international law. While torture is one thing, the positioning of individuals in areas where torture has a better chance of avoiding prosecution indicates the level of responsibility(Raustiala, 2009), and once again indicates the top down approach to torture that is central to the US War on Terror.

There remains a key question that these adapted aspects of US law have tried to address; at what point does interrogation stop and torture begins? By wording the 2002 torture memo and the 2003 memo giving powers to use increased methods of ‘coercive interrogation’ (Ignatieff, 2006) specifically, it is clear that the US sees the idea of coercive interrogation (torture to the rest of the world) as legally acceptable. It is of course, still in complete violation of the UN Convention against Torture, and in most cases the Geneva Convention (Roberts, 2007). Britain and Israel were charged with degrading and inhuman treatment of detainees but not of torture indicating that there is a practical difference between the two. Thus there must be a moral acceptance of coercive interrogation that does not cross any legal or moral boundary. It is the fact that torture is so narrowly defined by the US in its delineation of the end of coercive interrogation and the start of torture that is its undoing. It offers such an expansive array of actions in coercive torture that other nations can only see it as torture. Had it perhaps, added further legal safeguards, more than just the agreement of the Secretarty of Defense then there is a remote possibility that the broader definitions of torture, and the narrower definitions of coercive interrogation may have resulted in both a moral and legal acceptance on the international stage. This remains a remote idea. Further issues arise, as Tom Parker states, in that interrogators cannot be trusted to heed the distinction between coercive interrogation and torture (Anonymous, 2010). So far, this work has seen evidence that the torture of terrorist subjects is illegal regardless of the moves made by the Bush Administration with the basis of this answer having been legally addressed. It is now necessary to move onto the morality of torture in continuing the evaluation and support of the statement of this work, that the torture of terrorist subjects can be morally justified to a certain extent, but never legally justified.

The Morality of Torture

The morality of torture is much debated and rightly so. As this work has already accepted in accordance with international law, torture is illegal. There remains a difference between legality and morality, and it is this which is key in assessing whether the torture of terrorist subjects really can be justified. When asked initially, whether torture is right or wrong, the majority of people would say it is wrong, indeed it is for many ‘the deepest and most fundamental liberal taboo’ (Ramsay, 2006, p. 103). But when represented with the most common of arguments, the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ the majority would suddenly accept that, in a specific situation, torture may be morally acceptable. Some have descried this situational ethic as morality by numbers; pain for one, but safety for the majority.

Three main camps lie in this moral discussion between the deontological and consequentialist arguments. First there is the absolutist, or deontological, position – that under no circumstances can torture ever be committed, and it is both legally and morally wrong, in all aspects. A supporter of this camp is Dr. Mary Strauss (Galipeau, 2005). Her argument is founded on four key understandings; ‘the inefficacy of torture, alternative investigative techniques, the negative impact of torture use on society, and the likelihood of increased resort to torture’ (Galipeau, 2005, p. 5). Another keen supporter of this is Maureen Ramsay, who comments that ‘this absolute ban reflects the Kantian idea that there are acts which are wrong in themselves regardless of any good consequences’ (Ramsay, 2011, p. 627). For many, this seems morally untenable, as it offers no exceptional circumstances under which torture may be conducted, such as the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario. It also seems less realistic and more of a liberal ideal. There is no doubting that torture, although illegal exists in the world. While rather blunt, there is the argument that as several nations use it, it must be effective on some occasions, if not effective on all, however morally dubious it is.

Secondly, introducing the consequentialist arguments, there is the concept of ‘Torture Warrants’ as put forward by Alan Derschowitz (Dershowitz, 2002).  Dershowitz advocates the idea that while torture remains illegal and morally questionable, there is a greater moral duty to those who might be saved through information gained under torture. In making this acceptable, and in pursuit of minimising the amount of torture used, he suggests that ‘Torture Warrants’ may be obtained by legal consent in extreme circumstances. These are supposed to bring a certain level of not only justification to torture, but to also add a level of transparency and accountability to these proceedings. He claims that ‘it is better to control and regulate torture with accountability, record keeping, standards and limits, than to denounce torture but to tolerate extra-legal actions’ (Ramsay, 2006, p.108) Judge Richard Posner is a supporter of this idea, citing the idea of a ticking nuclear bomb in Times Square as the scenario when it is almost an individual’s responsibility to torture someone if there is the hope of stopping the device (Anonymous, 2010). All that happens however is that the decision to cross the moral and legal boundaries is taken out of the hands of the torturer and placed in the hands of a judge, which morally distances the torturer from the act. The concept of a priori approval is worrying as it creates a climate of moral acceptance in the case of torture (Ramsay, 2006). This is the start of a slide towards institutionalised and politically and legally ratified torture, and as David Cole states, the torture of the few leads to the torture of the many and in doing this, ‘you end up going down a slippery slope and sanctioning torture in general’ (McCoy, 2006, p.195).

Finally, there is the concept of Walzer’s ‘Dirty Hands’ (Walzer, 1973). Based on Machiavellian ethics, it is the idea that the lesser moral evil can be put aside to combat a greater moral evil (De Wijze, 2006). Key to this concept is that at no point is torture legalised or sanctioned in any way. It is up to an individual, Walzer’s Tragic Hero, to take it upon them to go above and beyond the call of moral duty. Oren Gross, a key supporter of this concept refers to this as pragmatic absolutism and official disobedience (Galipeau, 2005). Gross argues, a view supported by this work, that unlike Dershowitz’s concept of a conditional ban, there must be absolute ban on torture legally, and it is the only correct moral and legal course (Galipeau, 2005). He supports the idea that in some cases the final resort may be defensible, the concept of pragmatic absolutism, and this as a result of this government officials may find it necessary to break the law, the concept of official disobedience (Galipeau, 2005). This is done so in the knowledge that this is unlawful, but in the hope that a level of acceptance may follow, and the Tragic Hero may find some reprieve. This concept recognises the illegality of torture, recognises the moral dilemma of torture, and indeed supports the view that torture is morally wrong, yet it also keeps open a loophole of moral values that there may be a greater moral evil than torture – the mass murder of innocents. By relying on ex post justification, there is no passing of the moral responsibility onto a legal figure such as a judge – it remains on the conscience of the individual who conducted the official disobedience and became Walzer’s Tragic Hero with ‘dirty hands’. Gross states that ‘the public official is required to balance the absolute ban on torture against the perceived need to take extralegal action in order to prevent the catastrophic event (Galipeau, 2005, p.11).

Ramsay, in the discussion of Walzer, argues that while the ends may justify the means in that it has achieved some good, in this case a level of information that prevents a future deadly terrorist attack, it is still morally wrong (Ramsay, 2006). Ramsay then goes on to discuss Walzer’s Machiavellian and Weberian types of individual, noting that the colder Machiavellian ‘simply throws away morality for the good results that will be achieved’ (Ramsey, 2006, p.111), whereas the Weberian political actor is ‘a tragic hero, who is horribly aware that he is doing bad in order to achieve good and that in doing so he surrenders his soul’ (Ramsay, 2006, p.111). It is this moral calculation, deciding whether one accepts the moral consequences or ignore them, that separates the two and is critical in understanding whether there is any justification in the torture of terrorist subjects. It seems that once you have passed a boundary, whether it is legal or moral, there is no turning back,. It falls to an individual to provide the ends, which justify the means, and then it is up to this individual, Walzer’s Tragic Hero (Ramsay, 2006) to shoulder the moral weight of their own actions. There is a real risk that in turning from legal limits and relying on moral ones, that torture may become institutionalised. The reliance upon one political actor to cross the line and to act illegally, immorally but for a greater good is an excellent way for an institution to use torture but wash its hands of the act itself; to remain in support of torture as an illegal activity, but to turn a blind eye in bringing those amongst its ranks to justice in perpetrating the actual act of torturing someone (Ramsay, 2006).

While there is general acceptance that torture is morally repugnant, it is also clear that moral choices involving the lives of others, innocents, are able to balance out the morality of the torturers actions. As this work has previously stated, there is no legal justification for the torture of terrorist subjects. There is however an excellent case as presented by Walzer for the moral acceptance of torture as justification of terrorist subjects, if it prevents greater evil. The arguments denouncement of torture, support of its illegality, and notion of official disobedience is what separates it from the other consequentialist argument put forward by Dershowitz and which debunks the out dated moral absolutism put forward by Strauss and Ramsay.  It is this argument that provides the basis of the answer and the weight behind the statement of this work, that the torture of terrorist subject can be to an extent morally justified, but never legally. This work must now look at the final aspect of deciding whether the torture of terrorist subjects can really be justified; the results that torture, or the lack of, presents.

The Results of Torture

Having previously looked at both the legality and morality that surrounds the debate regarding torture, and in particular whether the torture of terrorist subject can really be justified, it is now necessary to look at the results of torture. Rather than providing the US with a wealth of actionable intelligence, there have been little clear gains or major plots averted thanks to the use of illegal torture, and the sacrifice of moral values (Anonymous, 2010). Other than this however, there are other negative results of torture. There are two main areas of this within the confines of torture results; the intelligence gained through torture and its use, and the international and strategic consequence of torture that the US then has to cope with.

Investigating the intelligence procured under torture, there are a number of worrying results that indicate that there is little justification in torturing terrorist subjects. It is this lack of information obtained and the criticism of many regarding the use of torture that signals most of all the unnecessary use of torture. FM 34-52, the US Army’s interrogation manual is blunt in its evaluation of torture or coercive interrogation; ‘the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear’ (Sands, 2005, p.209).

There is evidence which strongly supports the belief that torture brings about little in the way of actionable intelligence and material and which therefore undermines the argument that there is a justification in torturing terrorist subjects. A former high level CIA operator stated that ‘ninety percent of the information was unreliable’ (Evangelista, 2009, p. 83) when asked about the information extracted under torture. US journalist Ron Susskind reported that ‘the best information that came out of the captive may have resulted from nonviolent methods of interrogation’ (Evangelista, 2009, p. 85) a position that was supported by a 325 page report by the US Intelligence Science Board in 2006 (Evangelista, 2009). This is also supported by the findings of the US military with regard to the information gathered from detainees. Chris Miller, whose operated during the initial days of Operation Enduring Freedom stated that ‘one of our biggest successes in Afghanistan…came when a valuable prisoner decided to cooperate not because he had been abused…but precisely because he realized he would not be tortured’ (Galipeau, 2005, p. 5). 

Worryingly, it is not certain that each time the US tortures someone they are torturing a terrorist. This level of uncertainty should not be left to one side. Instead it should be a critical factor in the evaluation of torture as unjust. The torture of an innocent individual who happens to have been in the wrong place at the wrong time, by a state that is hell bend on seeing results and extracting a level of revenge on its enemies  is a huge miscarriage of justice. General Richard B. Myers, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated with regard to the initial detainees that were sent to Guantanamo Bay, that ‘these are people who would gnaw through hydraulic lines at the back of a C-17 (aircraft) to bring it down’ (Chatterjee, 2011), however it has been proved that this is not always the case. Indeed Chatterjee goes on to state that ‘almost one in five’ (Chatterjee, 2011) at Guantanamo Bay had no connection to terrorism.

This ever present fear of mistaken identity, that an innocent man may be tortured simply as he has the same name as a target should be more central to policy decisions. the decision to pay for supposed members of the Taliban and al Qaeda led to many local men being old to the US for cash (Ramsay, 2006). Likewise there is the issue that evidence obtained under duress, such as torture, is not permissible in Civilian Courts. This has led to a worrying rise in the US of using Military Tribunals to try and commit detainees.

Secondly, is it necessary to take into account how far reaching the acts of torture have upon the US. By committing morally repugnant acts such as torture, regardless of the situation, it is almost guaranteed that the US will polarise its support, domestically and internationally. For each nation that supports the actions, another will oppose them. This weakens the international standing of the US, undermining alliances, partnerships and willingness to aid the US. It is also seen as a rally call to those who would combat the US such as foreign fighters supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan – it aids the propaganda machine of those it wishes to fight in the War on Terror (Roberts, 2007). As Ramsay states, revelations of torture and systematic ill-treatment of prisoners have intensified the crisis in American relations with the Muslim world and acted as a rallying cry to a new generation of terrorist (Ramsay, 2006, p.113). It also goes a way to strengthen the resolve of the extremists. While initially, it may seem that through torture, the US can gain the upper hand, in the long run it may ultimately be its undoing (Ramsay, 2006). Domestic support for the Bush Administration plummeted, and support for the Obama Administration has taken a hit regarding the continued illegal torture of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and Iraq. Ultimately, with failing support, and the growing resolve of extremists against the acts perpetrated by the US, there is a risk that consequentially, these prove to be counterproductive acts.

Put bluntly, there is little that favours torture as a campaign winning pro-security move. It benefits the opposition too much, radicalising nations and groups arrayed against the US (Anonymous, 2010), risks repayment in kind against US forces and civilians, has proved ineffective against the resolve of extremists, and has tainted or provided falsehoods in any information extracted (Anonymous, 2010). Time and again, traditional interrogation, and ultimately empty threats of torture, have, as previously shown, given the US the information it needs without crossing any legal or moral boundary.

Conclusion

There is no doubting that the War on Terror is different to any previous conflict. This however does not ultimately pardon the US Administration which have perpetrated illegal torture and detainment of individuals, guilty or not. This work has stated throughout, in response to the question of whether the torture of terrorist subjects can be justified, that while the torture of terrorist subjects can be morally justified to an extent, there is no legal justification. This work has used evaluations of legal, moral and resulting arguments in order to provide a basis for this answer. Evaluation of the results and resulting actions that have affected the US also support the argument against justification of torture. Indeed, this work does not support the torture of terrorist subjects, but it must be made clear that a position of moral absolutism is not the way forward. It is necessary in this contemporary climate to be prepared to commit official disobedience (Galipeau, 2005), to carry out the unpalatable acts of torture in order to support a greater moral standing and duty to the cause. There may be no long term gains, and as always, torture remains illegal, but there must be an acceptance that rarely, an individual must perform the unacceptable, in order to support the greater good.

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Letters from Abbottabad; Osama bin Laden's Correspondence

Thursday saw the the publishing of Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? a selection of the documents seized in the raid which ended Osama bin Laden's life. The writings, a selection from the cache of over 6000 taken, point to the frustrations of trying to control a fractioned terrorist organisation.




The specific documents which will have been carefully chosen to ensure the right message is portrayed around the anniversary of Bin Laden's assassination; one of a crippled leader with dwindling influence, but still capable of inspiring deadly acts of terrorism; thus legitimising the operation undertaken to kill him.




The documents hint at a difference of vision between Bin Laden and his successor  Ayman al Zawahiri, CNN Terrorist  Analyst  Paul Cruickshank's suggests that 'Bin Laden, who had previously played the role of chief executive in al Qaeda, was cast in the role of a meddling chairman, micro-managing and second guessing al Yazeed and al Atiyah’s decision making from afar, while Zawahiri was cast into the role of a senior board member, providing advice and input into the terror network’s decision-making whenever he could get messages through to the operational commanders.' [1] Strategic differences were present in their vision, with Zawahiri favouring attacks on US interests in the Afghanistan theatre and on US Middle East interests, with Bin Laden still wanting attacks on the US homeland. Interestingly a public statement issued by al Zawahiri on the Arab spring is seen in edited form in one of the letters found in the compound, of the 12 proposed corrections only one appears in al-Zawahiri’s speech.

Furthermore some of the documents released are letters received by Bin Laden, including suggestions of , strategic failures, mergers with other groups,name changes for Al-Qaeda and the idea of Jihad repulsing many Muslims.These coupled with mistakes Bin Laden himself acknowledges, add to the image of a man grappling with failures he has limited influence over. It is impossible to know whether the correspondence reached their intended recipient, and the documents frequently mention lack of communication from other groups. 

Whilst the letters suggest the difficulties of leadership, faced by Bin Laden, exiled and in hiding in his Pakistani safe house; there still is plenty of evidence that he was still an effective strategic planner and monitor of world events. He Falsely saw the Arab spring as evidence of the Arab worlds rebellion against American influence 'What we are witnessing these days of consecutive revolutions is a great and glorious event, and it is most probable, according to reality and history, that it will encompass the majority of the Islamic world with the will of Allah, and thanks to Allah things are strongly heading towards the exit of Muslims from being under the control of America,' [2]. 

The same letter suggest responses to how Al Qaeda should react to the changes sweeping the Arab world, yet it also shows how the leader would suggest terrorist actions, such as hostage taking down to the smallest consideration. 'As far as the French hostages with our brothers in the Islamic Maghreb, I want to warn that the atmosphere after the French standing towards the Libyan people does not condone killing the French, due to what will follow of negative reflections, after it became evident that most of the common people are supporting Sarkozy, so if we need to kill them then that should be after the end of Libyan events' [3] continuing to suggest timing any action with the french elections. 


The document, incidentally Bin Laden's last, dated 26th April 2011; a week before his death, shows his wide interest in the overall scope of operations around the Middle East; suggesting further jihadist actions in Afghanistan, requesting information on actions in Iraq, on Brothers coming from Iran, hostage taking in Somalia as well as the overall need to insight further revolution in the Arab world. In his both ideas and requests for further information he seems to still be both well informed and capable of making suggestions which would affect the tactical and strategic actions of Al Qaeda.

It is interesting from a British perspective that, in a letter  discussing the focus on the US as a tree that needs felling it is important not to get distracted by smaller branches such as the UK; 'Assume that we have cut up 30cm of the trunk of that tree. We,then, see an opportunity to use our saw to cut into one of the branches. Say a branch that represents the United Kingdom. We should ignore that opportunity, and to go back to sawing the trunk of the tree.' [4]. It compares attacking the USA like attacking the Soviet Union in the 1980s, destroying the main body of its interests lead to the collapse of the whole USSR.

 The documents also highlight:

• Bin ladens strategic use of the media, citing the need to broadcast messages via Al-Jeezera in coincidence with the 10th anniversary of 9/11.

• The fear of Drones and the need for higher security measures to prevent Al-Qaeda operatives being targeted by them. (so much so that one letter instructed on the use of tunnels for meetings, the need for precise timings and decoy cars.)

• The order to create suicide squads to target President Obama and General Petraeus 

• The strategic planning to create change in US Policy by not targeting key figures such as Vice President Joe Biden "Biden is totally unprepared for that post (the presidency), which will lead the U.S. into a crisis,"  [5].

• Strategic and Tactical considerations for groups operating in various areas to ensure that there was reduced infighting between groups.

• Tactical considerations for suicide bombers, such as operating in pairs due to the psychological stress of the action.

• Views on other groups actions as well as strategic considerations involving Muslim civilians, various countries and the overall nature and image of Al-Qaeda 

Overall the letters confirm what was already predicted of Bin Laden's  final few years in hiding; a man who still had grand strategic visions yet was limited in his ability to convey these ideas to the organisation he headed. Rifts in vision with other senior members may hint at the the direction Al Qaeda may be taking after his death. The very fact that Bin Laden had become so isolated may point that his death was not as damaging to Al Qaeda as the US may have hoped. Yet whilst the exile may have reduced his abilities of leadership it is safe to assume from evidence within the published documents that in removing the man who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks, not only was revenge achieved but that also a key strategic thinker, adviser and visionary  was removed from the top position of Al Qaeda.

1. Bin Laden documents: Competing vision of Al Qaeda’s top two, By Paul Cruickshank, CNN Terrorism Analyst may 7th 2012
2.  Letters from Abbottabad: SOCOM - 2012 0000010
3.  Ibid
4.  SOCOM-2012-0000017-HT
5.  Bin Laden documents: The plotting continued, By Mike Mount May 3rd 2012

The Hunt for Bin Laden (TV Show)

It seems a picked a bad time to have a break from blogging, the last month has been filled with important events that have contributed to our understanding of the security and international relations world. From heightened police responses in London, Border security issues at Heathrow, and renewed tension in Egypt and Syrian it has been a busy month in the security world. 


I would first like to recommend the ITV documentary The Hunt for Bin Laden an insightful and interesting programme not only examining the final action of his killing, but also going back to review the long standing man hunt and investigation into the notorious terrorist.

http://www.itv.com/itvplayer/video/?Filter=315836

The Self Starter of Toulouse

What has emerged in the aftermath of the shootings in Toulouse has pointed at another spin on the 'lone wolf' theory; that of the motivated self starter. Despite travelling in regions associated with terrorist and insurgent training camps, finding the call of militant Islam and acting in line with religious beliefs it seems Mohamed Merah undertook these actions alone.

The evidence from his actions and background points to a dangerous cocktail of extremist views, a psychotic mindset and a criminal past mixing together to create a man who was capable of carrying out ruthless attacks, up in close proximity with his victims.

 

There were worrying signs from Merah's past; he had allegedly become obsessed with gory terrorist videos and attempted to radicalise Muslim youngsters in his neighbourhood. He reportedly was also a juvenile delinquent, guilty of a host of low level crimes whilst  paradoxically also being into football, theft, women and drinking, not the usual traits of a fundamentally inspired terrorist.

 

In the individual case of Merah the questions now lie with what assistance was provided by those close to him and should he been identified as a threat sooner? ,The issue of whether he should of had closer attention paid to him by France's domestic intelligence agency (DCRI) is a key point for debate, Yet there is a fine line between radical viewpoints and radical actions, keeping tabs on everyone identified as having a radical view becomes a dangerous undertaking...easily capable of inspiring action by those who feel threatened.

The theoretical interest for understanding this and possible future acts like this, lies with two considerations; Is the 'motivated self starter' even more of a threat than the 'lone wolf'? and how much fear is inspired by acts relatively simple to plan and carry out?

 

The 'lone wolf' (as discussed in  http://csaware.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/lone-wolf-terror.html)  has considerable advantage over the planning and logistical problems faced by small terrorist cells, yet can still be tracked and monitored due to established links and training with terrorist organisations; for example the UK threat of lone wolves points directly to extremists returning from time in countries such as Somalia. Let us for a moment assume that the reports are true and that Merah had no link with Al-Qaeda and that the supposed regional organisations were more inspirational than providers of training; that points to the idea that this 'lone wolf' was able to radicalise and inspire himself to undertake the acts which brought terrorism to the streets of Toulouse. In theory this then becomes the biggest threat, the idea that an individual can be inspired to commit terrorism with little contact with others, to take it one step further Merah could even be an exception in that there were warning signs in his travel and previous acts of violence and crimes, theoretically there could be motivational self starters who could achieve terrorist acts with few or no hints from their past pointing to radicalisation.

 

The acts themselves point to an even more worrying threat; the effectiveness of simple small arms attacks. The events in France have shown that a relatively small number of targets chosen for their religious or ideological significance can shock a country and induce fear, anger and response, all desired outcomes of terrorism. The fact this was achieved by the use of firearms points to the fact that simple conventional violent actions are still easily capable of causing shock and panic. Such actions avoid the chance of detection linked with acquiring explosive ingredients or even more obscure CRBN materials. Guns, whilst still causing suspicion, are far more often linked to the criminal class and thus do not raise the same alarms as more 'traditional' terrorist plots would. Merah was even able to incorporate the suicide martyr element into his actions with his last stand shoot out against police.

The counter consideration in the case of Merah and also in Norwegian massacre carried out by Anders Breivik are that these are two examples of individuals with psychotic and mental issues leading them to carry out violent actions in line with their religious and ideological views. Though undoubtedly identifiable as acts of terrorism they could be argued as horrific crimes which in  post 9/11 age have been linked under the ever growing umbrella of terrorist actions. However what is far more worrying is the idea that these 'lone wolves' are self starters, individuals who have been able to radicalise and arm themselves, giving them the ability to carry out violent acts with little or no help. The brutally simplistic nature of these acts also points to a much more simplified approach in terrorist acts one that is ultimately much harder to detect or predict.

RUSI's UK Terrorism Analysis

Just a quick post to draw attention to the Royal United Service Institutes's Report on Counter-Terrorism in an Olympic Year.

As seen in my 2012 predictions I think the security aspect of the Olympic Games will be a key talking point in the security sector in the coming months and RUSI's report is well worth a read.

http://www.rusi.org/ukta

I hope to comment on the report in a few days when I have managed to digest it all!

Lone Wolf Terror

Last week The Royal United Service Institute warned of the growing threat of lone wolf terrorists as in coming years Britons fighting and training with radical groups in Somalia and Yemen will return to the UK.

The question is then what does threat does the lone terrorist pose? The simple answer would be to assume that a lone actor is capable of achieving similar if slightly reduced results to terrorist cells, but whilst this is feasible it is perhaps more prudent to look at the different possibilities posed by a single actor than the possible similarities.

'The super empowered angry man' is a different actor to a small terrorist cell, for a start whilst sharing ideals and motives with a larger cause or terrorist organisation the motives and catalysts for action can be much more individually serving. In theory there are many more triggers that could cause a loner to act, from national to specific local issues. Unlike a terror cell which must adopt a group mentality to act, the individual is only concerned with his actions. Similarly the groupthink attitude which can influence a cells actions does not apply.

This can interpreted in many ways, while numbers can provide strength, support, logistical help and a greater will to act the lone actor is not constrained by the limiting factors such as need for meetings and planning with others. This in turn leads to the question of detection, with the communication and group element removed an individual actor can become harder to track as they are potentially harder to detect. Yet that must be considered objectively, any individual acting suspiciously round potential targets or in purchasing materials could be detected as easily as any group, it is the lack of a network or communication group that would potentially making detection harder.

A lone terrorist would have different target options to a terrorist group, it would be foolish to say this limits the threat, yet it changes its implications. For example there could be no coordinated strike such as in 7/7 and the scope for a hijack by a single actor would be limited, especially in the wary world post 9/11. Yet bombings or coordinated chemical attacks are an option, it is important to remember that it does not have to be devastating (statistically not emotionally) to produce a response of terror. Posted chemicals (fake or deadly) or a small explosive device with limited power are still capable of inciting fear; a suicide attack no matter how limited in its effect would still cause a large feel of unease amongst a population who wish to believe their government and security services are capable of thwarting terrorism.

Lone terrorists should not be underestimated, Anders Breivik perpetrator of the 2011 Norway massacre is a prime example of what a ideologically driven individual is capable of. In this situation the selection of the right target (a packed but isolated location) and one of the simplest forms of attack (a weapon carried and operated by himself) lead to tragic and horrific circumstances.

There is a final consideration, the classification of an act by a lone terrorist. Would the press, police and government recognise a lone act as terrorism or try and move the act into a crime setting. Whilst both terrorism and crime are obviously linked let us consider that there is an obvious difference between acts of violent crime and acts of violent terror. A lone wolf could in theory be considered an actor of violent crime rather than terrorism. If one thinks of the many instances of lone gunmen, assassins or bombers in the USA it is only in recent years that they have received a terrorist slant. Previously the acts were blamed on loners, mad men with violent murderous streaks, despite the perpetrators’ having strong ideologies, zealous religious ideas or cult beliefs. The risk is two fold, either an act being upgraded to a terrorist action due to the evidence of strong ideologies or beliefs, or the opposite a terrorist not being identified due to a lack of evidence (especially if harder to trace due acting alone) and the act being considered the actions of a violent loner. In the current threat environment the former is more likely than the latter.

It must be remembered that it is hard to predict whether the individuals who may return to the UK are plotting to undertake terrorist acts or will go through with acts they plan. These individuals would certainly be harder to detect than the ‘terror cells’ which has dominated recent years; but there is time for identification and investigation of these individuals currently operation overseas. For an attack to achieve its maximum potential risks would have to be undertaken by the individual in the planning stage, it is here where the cover offered by working alone can be blown. Similarly the limiting factors of working alone can limit the options and even ultimately the resolve of an individual actor, unless they are willing to carry out a hands on devastating attack similar to Norway. These limitations could make any threat or act hopefully less likely or at worst, less effective. This is no excuse for complacency rather a hopeful outlook of the lone wolf’s limitations.

Predicting the Unpredictable

Though I am no fortune teller and am wary of anyone who tries to guess at future trends without lengthy research and analysis, it would be remiss of me at this early point of the year to not suggest a few areas of that may be of interest in the coming year of International Relations. These are not predictions; more issues which I believe will be key parts of the security agenda in 2012.

After the Spring...

2011 was dominated by the Arab spring, as millions around the world turned their eyes to the various revolutions which changed the Middle East. Libya was the most bloody of the struggles and surely 2012 will see a growing stream of stories of heroism, horror and thought provoking observations which will accompany the aftermath of the Gaddafi regime. Whilst Syria will dominate the headlines in the coming months, the countries which changed the Middle East will be ever present in renewed security assessments of the region. Will military dominated countries like Egypt allow a smooth transition of power to more democratic governance? Will the armed groups who toppled various regimes be content with the inevitable mistakes that will be made in the birth of democratic process? And what of those who will not be content under new governance, those who form the basis of the alternative security dialogue?

Pirates...

The alternative security dialogue forms the basis of another area that will surely still be a focus of security concern in 2012, the continued presence of pirate activity off Somalia, the ‘country’ that remains an example of an alternative security discourse; somewhere that creates its own idea of security in what western orthodox views would see as anarchy and chaos. Increased pressure on the region has seen a large UK, EU and US navy effort in combating piracy, yet hijackings and hostage taking continues to take place. These actions and this region will surely continue to be the focus of security issues throughout 2012, yet will this be a continuation of the status quo or a change in the way this region affects the world.

Security of Sport...

2012 has dominated the sporting agenda in Britain since the announcement of the 30^th Olympiad in London on July 6^th 2005, the day after the announcement, the attacks of 7/7 set the current security agenda of the UK. Though the two events are linked only by date, the celebration of one is still linked with the fear of the other. Though the security operation surrounding the Olympic Games is a massive one, with huge numbers of police and military personal involved, there is perfectly rational thought process which identifies the games as real target for terrorism. Historically the Munich Olympics shows an example of opportunities for terror, but the presence of London land marks, the tube and huge crowds, presents a target never before seen for current portrayers of terrorism. I am not being overly pessimistic, as I believe and hope that such a plot would not succeed, yet in our conscious to conceive such acts we raise other questions of how securitised do events like this and others have to become now and in the future?  Does our ability to think up deadly scenarios linked to both huge events at day to day lives point at a success by terrorists, the creation of fear? Furthermore how much security is justifiable, when is there too much or too little and is the only way of knowing this gained through an unthinkable failure?

Korea Change...

The Death of Kim Jong-il and ascendancy of Kim Jong-un will be further investigated throughout 2012. Will the relatively unknown leader seek to rule in a continuation of his father’s style, will North Korea change under his rule or is his position weaker than we think? The closed country offers little information to the outsider, yet as with any new regime or leader, there is a risky period following their assuming of office. If he has to prove himself as the country’s Supreme Leader, will he do this through a show of military force in the region or will his methods be more inward looking? Could it be possible that he is the puppet of more hard-line (or equally modernising) generals and figures who will use him as a front for their own actions? I feel it may be likely that we see more sabre rattling in the region, but at the least, the future of North Korea will undoubtedly be shaped by events and actions in the coming year.

UK Military...

After a year which saw the UK military be part of heartfelt number one Christmas number one, the future of the UK military will again be forming news and security commentators’ headlines in 2012. Has the social-military nexus reached its peak with pop music success, or is there more to be had out of the new status of the UK military? Will the new found fame undermine the service’s record of silent service or will those who oppose UK foreign policy and military deployment use this as ammunition? Job cuts will surely bring questions of the UKs future deployments and role to the forefront of debate as will any discussion on Scottish independence and their role in UK foreign policy. Needless to say 2012 as with many years previously will see active discussion of the UK military and its roles.

Doomsday...

Do not fear I have no intention of turning this post into an agreement of those who believe 2012 heralds the end of the known world. However it may be worth considering that there are those who believe this Mayan prediction and it is possible that these believers could bring security risks of their own. It is hard imagine the pre-9/11 world, but it should be remembered that leading up to 2000 there was a genuine fear and risk posed from millennial and apocalyptic cults. These cults where envisioned as posing a conventional, chemical, biological or even nuclear threat in the years leading up to the millennium. Famously Aum Shinrikyo were semi successful in their Tokyo Sarin nerve gas attack of 1995 and it was “with Aum Shinrikyo, the world probably came as close as it has to true nuclear terrorism”(1). Theirs, and other groups’ motives revolved around neo-religious or apocalyptic perceptions of the year 2000 and any possible actions would have not been constrained by the same restrictions that apply to terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda (regional aims, alienating support, constituents, future actions etc.) These groups failed to materialise into anything more than a threat and were ultimately overshadowed by events in 2001, yet in the late 1990s there was genuine analysis of these cults. If cults like this were going to experience resurgence it would have begun several years ago, but considering the amount of cults in the USA alone it is possible that some event or issue may arise in 2012. I do not suggest these is going to be a surge of cult activity in 2012 but it may be an area worth paying attention to, a wild card in the possible events and issues of 2012.

The Unexpected...

So what about everything else? There is bound to be some issue that reaches the security agenda in 2012 that nobody will predict. Could it be renewed tension round the Falklands? A super power re –affirming its place in the world? Or a completely new threat arising? No doubt some topic that none of us would suggest in the early days of 2012 will become a major talking point, and memorable feature of this year.

The above and many other issues will contribute to the security and conflict agenda, 2012 like the years that have precede it will have unique events and continuing developments, the key question is whether what transpires will be a predictable continuation of current trends, or the start of a new direction for global security?

(1 )FROST, R. 2005. Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11. Adelphi Papers. 45 (378).

A Notable Reminder

It seems only right that I mark the start of this security blog, with the key story on the day of its launch; The guilty plea of Mohammed Chowdhury, Shah Rahman, Gurukanth Desai and Abdul Miah, 4 men who have admitted to planning to detonate a bomb at the London Stock Exchange. The men arrested in December 2010, pleaded guilty to engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism serve as reminder that terrorism on UK soil is still a very real threat.

The men, all British nationals, admitted planning to detonate a bomb at the London Stock Exchange, as part of a wider group of 9 which was plotting other attacks including letter bombs and pub bombings.

Whilst the trial and sentencing will be a matter for the news and public opinion, the more pressing questions lie within the ongoing debate over home-grown terrorism.

This case bears all the hallmarks that both students of terrorism and lovers of security based dramas are all familiar with; secluded meetings, contact over the internet, radical inspiration, logistical planning, sketches, target lists, terrorism literature and target observation. Similarly the plot being uncovered has a certain familiarity to it, MI5 surveillance, and a counter terrorism police operation. Could it be suggested that normality, a strange routine has begun to emerge in these cases?

To the security providers themselves the answer would be a resounding no, yet the layman could dismiss this as another case of radicalised fantasists who have had their comeuppance. Yet as the BBC’s Matt Prodger points out, it could have been very different there is a fine line between fantasy and realism, they could have remained undetected, they could have carried out these attacks.

The many questions, which sadly cannot be answered here, now stem from a decade of living under this threat of terrorism (and many more decades of other sources of terror). Are we safe? What threats are out there?  When will this happen again?

Yet there are more hidden questions that have a more abstract thought process, Will there ever be a successful attack, are these terrorists any good? Or have we grown more resilient, are we less disturbed by these revelations? For example think back to the amount of news time this would have gained in the post 9/11 years (admittedly this view plays to one of my key thesis that our understanding of terrorism is shaped very much by the media).

Undoubtedly there would be ways for this view to change; the most shocking would be a destructive attack itself, something which all conscious people must secretly fear in 2012, a year in which so much attention is being drawn on London and Britain. A simpler catalyst would be a plot uncovered which didn’t play to these ‘norms’, something wholly different yet equally as chilling.

I do not suggest there is complacency, certainly not in the security providers who have stepped up their role in line with the pressures of 2012.  Perhaps then in a period dominated with questions of reaching out to disenfranchised and disinterested groups with in society, the question that has always been present but never been answered over the last 10 years should once again be considered; why do these ideas of hatred, and violence grow within our country. Perhaps today, along with anniversaries of both failed and successful terrorist efforts and visual demonstrations of anti-British sentiment should be a reminder that there is still much to do on a societal level in the provision of security for the UK.