Lessons Learned? - Introduction

On viewing the brilliant BBC documentary; Afghanistan: The Great Game - A Personal View by Rory Stewart I  was compelled to think deeper about the nature of learning from previous military conflicts.

This has lead to me sharing several observations that I have investigated academically over the last 2 years, firstly an overall examination into the nature of military lessons (Lessons Learned) and secondly a more specific investigation into learning from previous counterinsurgencies in support of contemporary strategies (How Counterinsurgents Learn). Finally I offer an historical perspective and conclusion.

It is an often quoted adage that we ignore previous lessons, experiences and history at our peril. Certainly the view presented by Rory Stewart in the Afghanistan context points to this; British, Soviet Union, US and coalition forces making similar mistakes over the course of 170 years of warfare. A counter argument suggests we can draw conclusions to quickly in discovering similarities, an even more critical approach could suggest that previous failures drive military and government to attempts to overcome problems which themselves, allies and enemies have previously failed.

Does this mean that governments and military planners will continually make mistakes which historical evidence could of helped avoid, or are conflicts separate entities to be viewed as individual events separate from previous and future similarities. I hope the following essays will shed some light, both theoretically and in direct reference to contemporary events.

How Counterinsurgents Learn from History and Experience.

“The Experience of the past years clearly shows that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by military means only” (Tsagoiov 1987, cited in Hughes 2008 p.1), a statement that rings true two decades later, making the US seem to have overlooked history; but when Colonel Tsagoiov summed up the Soviet experience it also showed a disregard for a whole range of previous military experiences by themselves and others. To this extent parallels can be drawn from across history which show examples of militaries seemingly ignoring the lessons of counterinsurgency (COIN) and making the same mistakes, which either they or other countries have previously made. To the cynical this represents an ongoing trend of reliance on conventional force and being geared to fight the previous war; to moderates a lack of adaptation; but what this view overlooks is the general and in recent years concise effort to learn from history and experience. As Fuller points out, since Vietnam the US army has kept ‘lessons learned’ databases and an extensive catalogue of experience based literature (Fuller 2008 p.36) furthermore the recent explosion of COIN literature focuses most of its recommendations from success and failure in the past. This essay will therefore outline how practitioners of COIN make an effort to learn from history and experience, but it will also analyse their shortcomings. By reviewing the application of history we can see its merits, but also where the blinkered approach ignores wider historical lessons. Furthermore I will explain how some of the lessons from history are unsuitable for application in situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan and that strategy, culture and an approach to warfare as a whole, are all equally as critical factors in COIN.

The divisions over the application of history and experience fall into various groups, with some arguing the benefits of historical study and others seeing it as limited in its application, W. Fuller claims that the concept of a military lesson might be dubious (2008 p.44) where as J.F.C. Fuller claims that to ignore the application of historical experience turns its study into “nothing but a bloody romance” (1926, cited in Cordesmann 2004b). It is wiser to consider that historical experience does indeed have its place but as I will show, has limitations based upon the differences between situations. It is also important to remember the scope of history in context with learning from it. COIN literature tends to focus on the period Kilcullen calls, classic COIN experience and theory, mainly from 1944-1980 (2006 p.112). This, however, overlooks the early years of COIN in its colonial setting at the turn of the century, such as the Boer War or the US in the Philippines. Furthermore, it ignores many of the earlier examples of dealing with insurgency, such as situations from the Napoleonic wars right back to the Roman Empire. As Beckett argues, insurgency has been a factor of war since the start of history and is mentioned in antiquity such as in the Bible, by Tacitus or by Sun Tzu (2001 p.8). This is not to say I advocate the reliance on classical history as being the same as modern problems but as Gumz explains there is a potential for a greater understanding of history by moving away from the conventional to non-conventional evolution of warfare which creates rigid frames of old and new. (2009). Therefore, understanding there is a bias to the ideas of new wars helps us understand how counterinsurgents learn from history. Quite rightly, they wish to find examples that fit with warfare in an age of globalisation, human rights, global terrorism and the internet. This therefore leads to looking closer to the modern age rather than delving deep into the history books, but two ideas should be considered. Firstly, there is no direct precedent for many of the new elements of warfare. Secondly, operational and tactical experiences of the last 60 years have been tailored for application in today’s COIN environments, so why can examples from 200 years ago not be as well? To answer the latter would be to veer off into perspectives of military history, but it is important to consider when analysing what militaries adopt and learn from.

Regardless of which historical perspective and scope, various scholars who have used the literature in the last decade have been almost unanimous at pointing to the same recommendations, failings and lessons that the US and its coalition partners need to address. Namely, legitimacy, good governance, unity of effort, interagency approach, winning over the population and committing to COIN both in terms of time and approach. These ideas are built upon the experiences of COIN since World War II and represent the efforts to analyse experience and use its lessons for the current situations. Empirically, the recommendations are obviously related to historical experiences, the interagency and leadership examples can be seen as products of the problems of split civilian, intelligence and military approach of the US in Vietnam; the good governance and population support where key approaches of the British in Malaya. Both failures and successes become key to the development of COIN yet it would be wrong to think the literature was ultimately forward thinking in its recommendations, using history as the basis for its study.

As Reis explains in his analysis of British, French and Portuguese COIN, “doctrines emerge as reactions to ongoing campaigns” (2006 p.33), similarly the approaches being suggested by RAND and FM 3-24 are in reaction to the current situations and then using history to back these suggestions up. This then differs from conventional military history, which traditionally uses a war to update its approaches, but ultimately means militaries are fighting the last war. In the situation of COIN the use of history is not linear with analyses being made by fishing experience from the past. As previously mentioned, this is not necessarily a bad approach, nor is it right to think that literature has not existed prior to recent years. The doctrinal changes suggested in the 1960s, in addition to the works of Galula, show that there has been COIN available, but the sudden boost in COIN material; with more books written in the 4 years before 2006 than there had been in the previous 4 decades (Kilcullen 2006 p.111) showing that COIN history is chequered and reactionary rather than evolutionary.

Based on this view the analysis of how counterinsurgents learn reaches a crossroads, it could be argued that this use of history and experience is entirely justified; indeed there is nothing wrong with seeking historical evidence to back up the desired contemporary approach. Yet it is more prudent to accept this as the norm but highlight the inherent problems of such an approach and then couple this with the problems of adapting COIN history as a whole. The most cynical analysis would say that in adapting COIN in a reactionary fashion actually shows that counterinsurgents do not learn from history and experience, but rather borrow from it when the situation requires. This certainly seems apparent with the almost parallel development of COIN doctrines in the Vietnam and then Iraq wars (Long 2008). Yet to agree entirely with this view would mean to ignore genuine efforts by some, such as special forces, academics and forward thinkers to put COIN history in the mainstream and its experiences into doctrine throughout the decades where it “waxed and waned” (Long 2006). It then becomes more prudent to accept this as a genuine deficit in the learning process of COIN and actually identify this as a historical experience lesson in its own right; “Vietmalia” (Holbrooke 1998, cited in Baumann and Yates 2004 p.2) is a genuine fear, much like Lieutenant Colonel Francois explains Algeria was for the French (2007). Not only do countries learn from COIN operations, they can also learn they do not like them, especially one with a deep mark on the nation’s history. It would be naive to think that COIN situations could be avoided, as they have evolved as the only challenge available to the militaries that were built up, ironically under the massive focus on conventional warfare doctrines. Yet it goes someway to explaining why COIN took a back seat post Vietnam, when the Cold War and threat of European conventional war was still a possibility and that its history is now undergoing resurgence due to operational requirement.

Fundamentally that is not the problem; the problem arises in two by-products of such an approach. Firstly and theoretically, will this be the case at the conclusion of every COIN operation, as it is seen as different to the conventional warfare that doctrines and armies are primarily designed for? Secondly, does such an approach bring further problems due to its wish to find answers from the past? To answer the first in line with the essay, it is hard to predict but the question is an important consideration into how militaries and politicians look at COIN. As Long points out after Iraq there are possibly other conventional enemies (2008) and to truly learn from COIN would be to keep its experiences indoctrinated even if not directly in use. The second point is a clear signpost to deeper analysis of how COIN history is used. It is true to say that most current military assessments and commentators recommendations are happy to use prior experiences yet are wary of their application. From the start FM 3-24 clearly outlines “you cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic Extremists the same way as we fought the Viet Cong” (US Department of the Army 2006 p.1). Even concurrent successful COIN operations cannot be directly applied to others hence Glenn’s chapter “Fitting RAMSI’s square peg into the world’s round hole” (2007 p.12). In itself this represents a crucial historical COIN lesson that success in one area is not directly transportable, be that on a tactical, regional, historical or as demonstrated here, operational level. Such an understanding therefore shows that the contemporary approach to COIN does have a logical historical approach.

Where the logic falls down however, is that such an approach inevitably leads to a less then concise historical analysis; making the lessons borrowed from experience be taken very generally rather than truly scrutinising them for the factors behind victory or failure. As previously mentioned, the successes of the British in Malaya are cited as good examples for COIN but their experiences are taken generally in terms of good governance and being population-centric, as the overall experience is considered a relic of Imperialism and hard to apply due to its colonial setting (Reis 2005 p.31). In only taking general lessons, some of the deeper operational and tactical experiences are therefore overlooked; the British use of civil expertise, autonomy of battalion structure, use of ID cards and  importance of low level command, have direct links with the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan but get ignored due to its colonial and therefore seemingly limited application. (Mackinlay and al-Baddawy 2008) This can of course be turned on its head, in that in addition to ignoring some of the deeper lessons of previous COIN and despite FM 3-24’s assurance of the difference of current situations; recommendations and commentaries try to find suitable historical examples for the situations that are simply unprecedented. Cynically this could be a guilty response to the gap in COIN history, but nevertheless the need to back up suggestions with historical experience will seemingly fall flat in the search for answers to global jihad, internet propaganda and non-regional insurgents. As Olson points out there are now ungovernable areas as a product of global media and globalisation which are new options for insurgents (2007).Furthermore whilst Islamic ideals can be studied this does not offer an operational strategy for COIN on the ground. Historically COIN has not got a great success record and seen as many of the options are considered of limited use due to their colonial or historical setting, those seeking to find answers are left with few options. Whilst Mackinlay and al-Baddawy point to a deeper understanding of the Israel and Palestine experience as a possible source for answers (2008); we see that there is also a deficit in militaries learning from the experiences of those outside doctrinal similarities. As Thompson pointed out, COIN has a national history and is rarely developed from the experiences of others (1969, cited in Mackinlay and al-Baddawy 2008 p.8). Whilst this has evolved to those sharing similar experiences through coalitions it explains why the Soviet experience in Afghanistan was ignored and points out the avoidance of the darker side of COIN; barbarism.

A paradox emerges when considering barbarism in COIN, quite rightly would be counterinsurgents seek to avoid it, eschewing its use both currently and finding no positives from its historical use. It serves as a reminder of failures; such as the French in Algeria and also galvanises the principles of population support, legitimacy and good governance. Its avoidance also covers up the chilling but realistic view of the power that outright barbarism has in stopping insurgency; whether it be massacres by the Ottomans, Romans or Nazis, the idea of “making a wasteland and calling it peace” (Tacitus n.d., cited in Luttwak 2007 p.41) still represents the impracticable side of COIN. Several considerations arise from this, such as are there any useful elements from the barbarism style of COIN? Or does it represent an alternative security and order discourse? Yet whilst it is unlikely COIN practitioners will ever try and separate the positives of Roman style deterrence from the barbarism, what emerges instead is the aforementioned paradox. The paradox is that separating desired COIN from a barbaric approach is a cultural decision as much as it is a strategic and operational one; and that culture is one of the crucial areas where counterinsurgents fail to address. Not only a cultural understanding of the nation or area where COIN is to take place, but an understanding of their own culture, both how it effects COIN development and how it is perceived by those who COIN seeks to influence.

The former and latter points are among the many findings of the COIN literature based from the historical experiences which point to the need to understand a nation’s culture and how to portray one’s own. It is perhaps the lesson which seems to be the hardest to follow despite its historical basis. Certainly the latter point, as all prior experience points to the need for population support leading to the rise of the “strategic privates and civilians” (Kilcullen 2006 p.114) as direct embodiments of the mission and culture of the COIN operation. This lesson is merged with all others as it effects the approaches of the operation; it can explain why democracy and human rights are used to try and achieve COIN, but without an understanding of the host culture it can lead to failure. Thus it can be all traced back to the main analysis of how counterinsurgents learn from history and experience and ultimately it is through the lens and framework of a nation’s strategic culture.

To use the USA as an example is prudent as they are driving force behind today’s COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the example is not limited to them. Britain’s COIN is shaped by its former Imperial culture; the Soviet approach in Afghanistan was influenced by its repressive culture. The USA, as Gray points out, ignores the traits which build up its strategic culture and are ultimately damaging to COIN operations ; being apolitical, astrategic, techno-dependent, focused on firepower, offensively balanced, culturally challenged, ahistorical and impatient (2006). Whilst all the points contribute to the USA’s approach it is the last 3 that seemingly fly in the face of learning from historical experience. As Gray further demonstrates US COIN if not its whole approach to war in general has suffered since the Indian wars with “a failure to understand the enemy of the day” (2006 p.34) Furthermore the approach to the past at best demonstrates a staggered reactionary learning process and at worst plays into the hands of those who accuse militaries of not learning from the past. Rightly or wrongly parallels are drawn with Vietnam and the ‘body bag effect’ sidesteps the massive difference in casualty figures; as Colin Powell stated about Somalia “what wouldn’t have merited a press conference in Vietnam” (Baumann and Yates 2004 p.2) lead to inglorious withdrawal in Somalia. There are those who still have an axe to grind over Vietnam and there are those to which history was in the past and that is where it shall stay; both are dangerous options for formulating COIN strategy. Yet it is Gray’s mention of impatience that is the best indicator in an analysis of learning from history.

Time is ultimately the measurement of COIN operations; success and failure are linked with a change in government, the withdrawal from a country, but as the old adage states ‘only time will tell’. Time enshrines actions into history and then ultimately the process of scrutinising places the experience into a framework for those who seek to learn from it. That is what is happening now, and will continue to do so. Yet no conclusion can be complete without the major consideration put forward in FM 3-24 “there is no silver bullet” (2006 p.1-28). COIN is marked by paradoxes; you can win militarily but lose overall, or more security can make you less secure. Only when viewed as an ever changing landscape can an assessment of how counterinsurgents learn from the past truly come forward, I have previously argued the change in military affairs and an observation made there is equally relevant here; “it is important to remember warfare is a human enterprise and as such has many variables, that cannot be as clear cut as the experience of the last war” (Cheetham 2009 p.9). What that presents us with models not templates (Glenn 2007) and that the use of history and experience is not the holy grail of COIN.

That being said, those who ignore history do so at their peril, it is why we have arrived at the sudden need for past COIN examples and the growth in those seeking them, in conclusion one must consider the ignorance of previous decades as well as the current situation. It would be wrong to fall into of the trap of saying counterinsurgents do not learn from the past. Evidence is clear that efforts are made, though it has been a roundabout process in which examples for the past are sought to back up contemporary analyses. Many lessons of history are still ignored, yet in addition so are many contemporary recommendations. This relates to the simple fact that all the literature, doctrines and ideas do not put boots on and go to Iraq or Afghanistan. Learning from COIN experience is only half the problem; implicating and using those lessons is an equally difficult  task. Overall, COIN is part of a wider approach that straddles the grey area of political and military policy and only with a correct strategy can a solid COIN operation be conducted; a strategy, which is ultimately influenced by experience and strategic culture thus compounding the need to understand history and its lessons. Counterinsurgents learn from history by comparing the need of the day with lessons of the past. There is still more that could be adopted in analysis and it needs to happen on a larger scale than just at a recommendation and doctrinal level, but overall it is a better approach than the denial seen in previous years. “Historical feasibility” (Kalev 2005 p.12) has become a key part of developing ideas, considering it took several years of COIN failure to bring this approach in, one can only hope that after the current set of engagements end it remains part of the process. 

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Chewing on the Wires; The Gap in Olympic Security?

It would be hard to deny that the military and security build up seen for the coming Olympic games does not provide a strong and determined image of deterrence for any would-be attacker or perpetrator of terrorist attacks. A frigate on the Thames, larger number of troops than currently in Afghanistan and batteries of Surface to Air missiles surrounding London; all contribute to a coherent and planned security effort. But is there a gap?

Theoretically this build up could be bypassed by extremely well planned and covert terrorism or a determined strike by a foreign aggressor, but realistically and thankfully this seems highly improbable. Defence Minister Philip Hammond MP has said that there is no specific threat and that the military will be in the background as 'ultimate reassurance'.

The gap then could be exposed in a much more mundane and frustrating way; low level disruptive acts carried out by those not wishing to kill or maim, but those wishing to damage credibility, cause disruption and generally hamper the success, image and idea of the games, host country and  the capitalist ideals that accompany the former.

The reports of threats from anarchist groups such as the Informal Anarchist Federation, wishing to cause low level warfare against the Olympic games points to the kind of threat in which little can be done in preparation for.

If we consider the disruption and problems caused by the theft of cable from rail infrastructure, an idea of some of the available tactics become apparent. To speculate even more, the options for a determined anarchist to cause low level damage, they need only find important cabling, electricity or communication points to damage and there would be a small but disrupting effect. If one casts their mind to any large transport, sports, leisure or shopping area it is easy to remember seeing points where an individual seeking to annoy and disrupt could cause problems.

The flip side of this consideration is that any low level disruption can be dealt with at a low level, quick repairs, contingency plans and fast responses are all tools in reacting to such disruptive tactics. Such a view however overlooks the main aim of such attacks; credibility and symbolism being damaged.

Consider for a moment the national and international grief, sympathy and response to a (highly unlikely) coordinated terrorist attack; similar sympathy would not be felt to repeated low level disruption that would hamper attendees, events and infrastructure. Such tactics would embarrass organisers, hack off spectators and further annoy Londoners who would be already combating congestion, crowds and delays.

I find the idea of a large terrorist attack highly unlikely to materialise and even less likely to succeed, yet the idea of groups undertaking disruptive acts are much more likely. These acts would probably only be defeated with quick responses and back up infrastructure. The efforts of those to annoy, hamper and disrupt may then highlight the only real 'gap' in Olympic security.

The Re-emergence of Order in Basra

Examining the re-emergence of order in the post conflict city of Basra through investigating key theoretical perspectives.

As the British military mission in Iraq came to its conclusion, Basra’s fate as a post-conflict city passed to the Iraqis. In 6 years of British control from April 2003 to April 2009, there had been numerous problems for the occupying military, the 1.5 million inhabitants of Iraq’s second largest city (Human Rights watch 2003 p.1) and the various bodies that tried to implement security within the city. Order and security, contested concepts as they are, had to a degree re-emerged. However, it was not the western liberal orthodox perspective of order that had grown in Basra. It was instead the challenge to this view, (and approach to its implementation) which saw “the main sub-state factions share out state-based resources, running the police and controlling the revenues from oil smuggling and the distribution of political power (Hills 2010 p.317). Whilst this perhaps overlooks the violence and crime which supports the factional approach within the city, it does give a clear idea of along what lines order re-emerged within Basra; the concepts of identity and ghettoisation of security. Three years later, as the city emerges as a much more stable and peaceful place, (Guardian 2010) it is important to consider what events dominated the post- conflict environment and kept it locked in factional power struggles, in which order and security took on very different forms, to the centralised control of today. This essay will therefore show how useful the perspective of ghettoisation is to an understanding of Basra, but also explain there are other factors which contributed to the overall process. I will argue that while the theoretical process is indeed the main source of understanding, this builds on historical and empirical factors and may also be due to the lack of analytical literature on the subject.

The literature on Basra, as with Iraq as a whole, presents a range of different perspectives. Not only is it hard to avoid the heavy bias towards the USA’s involvement, but there is also the mixed feeling of the war’s legitimacy and legality. In addition various actors and commentators report the situations with significant bias towards their own agendas, be it military, humanitarian or the critical approach of the press and anti-war protesters. The British press, for example, repeatedly cited growing public opinion turned against the deployment of UK forces and stories shifted to the growing futility of occupation, which does not necessarily give an accurate portrayal of the overall process of order re-emergence. It is the academics such as Hills, Dodge and Cole who present more grounded views based on security and post conflict theories; one of the reasons ghetto security is such a useful tool is that it accompanies one of the few overall assessments which is not dominated by cynical or military bias. It is Hills that presents the idea of the “ghettoization of security, whereby specific groups or types of people are secure in only restricted areas” (Hills 2010 p.303) as part of the unique environment created in cities and directly links it to Basra. As a theoretical perspective based on empirical evidence it provides a strong starting point from which to examine order re-emergence.

In order to effectively consider the re-emergence of order in Basra two theoretical concepts must be assessed, firstly the concept of order itself. Order is linked with both security and power, yet the link is not horizontal as power ultimately becomes the dominating factor. As Hills points out “order and security are interwoven, but while security facilitates order, order is necessary for meaningful security” (2009 p.2). While a liberal orthodox view would automatically assume that order is the same as security, that is to fall into the trap of what is desired under a liberal democracy; as Hills argues order is an agreed set of rules, repressive or democratic based on regularity and predictability (2009 p.11). It should also be remembered then that if security can be the tool to achieve order, security therefore becomes desirable to those who want order. Similarly, power which is inherent in actors is “the most fundamental in post-conflict cities as it underpins and is expressed through order and security” (Hills 2009 p.15). Therefore it is possible to have order without security, but order requires someone to be exerting power to make that order. To consider in the context of pre-war Basra, order was maintained by the Saddam regime as an expression of its power. The order was repressive and brutal, but still provided security. It was certainly not the kind of security that human security advocates could promote but it differed massively with the insecurity present in looting and violence which followed the regime’s collapse.

Order in the context of Basra as a post-conflict city is therefore based on the new symbols of power, and as the Ba’athist regime was not replaced with an equal, or similar centralised system of control instantaneously, the power to provide order did not come from a central national source. In fact it was the void created by the sudden collapse of all centralised control and its means of implication that meant order in Basra had to come from a regional source. Urbanization, as Hills reminds us, is based on social relationships and therefore has many actors present (2010 p.304). Of these, no single power emerged at the conclusion of the war as the dominant winner, the regime and its infrastructure including the police and army was melting away.  The Shia militias, which were to become hugely influential, were actually weak at the cessation of hostilities (Cole 2007 p.111); the only group with the force to do anything along the lines of creating an instant repressive order were the British. Not only had they no intention of doing this, they actually went the other way allowing a breakdown in order in terms of looting as a symbol of the end of the previous regime. This at the time was tolerated, as a British officer pointed out due to powerful message it sent “that we are in control now, not the Ba’ath party” (Financial Times 2003, cited in Hills 2009 p.109). The British sought order through security, though through allowing its initial breakdown, the other actors of Basra could adopt this approach as well. Therefore the re-emergence of order in Basra became inseparably linked with actors seeking to provide security as a tool to achieve order, as a legitimizing factor of their power. This in turn affects the population who “look to whichever group offers them the best chance of survival” (Talentino 2004, cited in Dodge 2007 p.26); the main theme of the second crucial concept to be examined; the ghettoization of security.

Ghetto security is arguably the most applicable theoretical perspective in an assessment of Basra. Whilst other theories, such as self perpetuating spirals, or corruption could be examined, it is the ideas ghetto security and its explanation of the importance of identity as the referent object of security, which make it the most applicable to Basra. “Security is an essentially contested concept” (Baldwin 1997 p.7) but it becomes easier to apply one of its concepts to situation, if we can dismiss the ideas based around those that would argue for one of its other perspectives. Hills is quick to assert “exclusionary actors of local or sectarian groups are more influential than those of state based agents or projects based on security for the individual” (2010 p.301). Whilst accepting  security is not just about survival, (Smith 2005) as this would mean individuals acted independently, the idea of ghetto security puts identity as its main form of security; and thus a group of a shared identity as the referent object. The individuals’ security concerns become part of the group, much along the lines of Buzan’s identification of societal security and identity (2000). As Dodge points out “the struggle to gain a degree of predictability for yourself and your family becomes obtainable primarily through an increasing militant deployment of ethnic or sectarian identity” (Dodge 2007 p.26). Thus the growth of militias in Basra can be explained not by the human security, or emancipation theories, which cynically could be considered the most ‘liberally attractive’ but Hills dismisses as “detracting from the realities of post conflict security” (2010 p.302). Instead the growth of the militias and the security they wish to enact was along much older foundations of tribal and religious groupings.

The value of ghettoisation in understanding the re-emergence of order in Basra should not be overlooked; it provides an anchor from which to base an explanation of a very complex series of events and groups which came about in the post-conflict city. There is not space for a detailed narrative of events, nor would it be useful, it is much more prudent to look at two areas which highlight ghetto security in action; the growth of militia power and the post conflict role of the police. The rise of the militias grew from the lawlessness that took hold in the early days of the British Occupation, two crucial factors mark their appearance. Firstly that whilst the violence and destruction, apparent during the looting and early stages of post war Basra was ultimately the initial source of security failure to the British; it was the catalyst for sectarian groups to begin to act in providing security.  As Dodge points out, militias grew in this early phase from a few men guarding streets into neighbourhoods, and then districts as people sought protection (2007 p.35). Sadrist mosques organised vigilantes and water supplies (Hills 2009 p.112) whilst groups had to provide armed men to protect hospitals, and infrastructure (Human Rights Watch 2003). Even the groups who did not embark on ensuring security took this opportunity to become stronger, joining the looting or taking part in carjackings. The sectarian elements born in this early phase, were quickly compounded by the military occupation of the city, which by its very nature divides the city up in the use of roadblocks, division of units and patrols; (Hills 2009 p.41) thus helping the identity politics flourish.

Secondly, the sectarian divisions which categorised the ghettoisation of Basra were deepened further with the democratic, governance and security approach of the British and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Policies and actions intended to increase security and establish conventional bases of power meant a furthering of divisions as the groups sought more power for their identity. Not only was this an increase of “public services, economic subsistence and physical survival, through ad-hoc and informal channels” (Dodge 2007 p.26) this was a re-emergence of the products to create order based on the very issues that the British and CPA would identify as destabilising elements; predominantly violence. Al-Karamisha marsh Arab tribe fought with Shia militias after its leader was targeted (Cole 2007 p.119). The Badr brigade who provided much of Basra’s security clashed with Fadhila, represented in the police by Chief al-Waili (Cole 2007 p.118). Main political parties were divided against each other and provincial councils were contested as to their ethnic make-up.  As the coalition attempted “human rights, constitutional reform, free markets and feminism” (Stewart 2007, cited in Hills 2010 p.308) militias provided a more traditional option for either security and opportunity or violence and resistance. Sectarian groups used (in)security as a way to gain goals and achieve a degree of (dis)order depending on their motives (Hills 2010). Economic infrastructure, political allegiance and security provision all became part of the wider struggle by sectarian groups. As Rubin reminds us, “without the separation of politics and politicians from violence and the regulation of the latter by law, civilian politics and politicians are impotent” (2008 p.36). Based on this view it is then prudent to consider the law element, which further contributed to the ghettoisation, as was seen through divisions in the police.

The police in Basra represented not only another prime example of the inherent identity divisions which point to the theoretical process championed by Hills, but also one of the weaknesses which dragged out the re-emergence of order process. What little police remained after the fall of the regime were the lowest rung of an oppressive security apparatus, “30 years of neglect had left the Iraqi National Police (INP) with low standards, poor management and a firehouse mentality, remaining in their stations until ordered to make arrests”(Perito 2007 p.3). It is wrong to assume as Ria does that re-employing the 500 officers who returned in April 2003 was “re-nazification and re-employing  functionaries of the torture state” (2003 p.112) as the evidence shows that even if they were former Mukhebarat officers, the British had them under such a tight leash they were virtually powerless. Spread thin (“by mid 2003 just 900 unarmed local police and 48 British MPs policed 1.5 million inhabitants” (Hills 2009 p.47)) and constrained to be subservient to a British approach any image the police could maintain security and subsequently the traditional sense of order, had gone. It was only through mass recruitment that the police managed to gain any power and this was due to the infiltration of its ranks by the militias; thus sucking the police into the sectarian provision of order.

The growth in police numbers grew with an increase in groups attempting to provide security and the divisions split up the re-emergence of order along these sectarian lines. Police vehicles openly showed their factional allegiances, whilst policemen joined the various groups to feel protected. Different parts of the police belonged to different political groups and these in turn controlled different areas of the city; Fahila and the tactical support controlled the oil terminals, whilst Moqtada and the regular police held the ports and customs (Hills 2009 p.111) Police commanders feared the power of the militias who controlled their men and certain units would only patrol certain areas for their own safety. Whilst these divisions played havoc with the British desire to attempting police reform, the alternatives to the identity based system where apparent. Though some of the population called for a return of the brutal former police force if it meant more security (Human Rights Watch 2003 p.20 and Stewart 2007, cited in Hills 2010 p.308). Incidents such as the destruction of the Jameat police group in 2006, which combined all major factions in torture and brutality (Hills 2009 p.111); served as a reminder that ghetto order was more desirable than former centralised security.

It would be wrong however to think there were no other factors contributing to the overall state of Basra. The British military for example is a large contributing factor to the re-emergence of order; its initial actions allowed the breakdown which created a partial security vacuum, for the identity politics to flourish and concessions the British granted compounded its growth. In addition to this there are more simple factors contributing to the drawn out process of the re-emergence of order, such as the hindrance to security presented by the low UK troop numbers and the military approach to protecting installations and personnel rather than policing and concentrating on crime. In addition there was a lack of any form of civilian policing authority in great numbers. The latter factor along with many others was recognised in 2003 and was known long before from lessons of previous British missions such as Kosovo (Human Rights Watch 2003). Even anti-British feeling had a role; as an identifying factor for Basra residents which went across sectarian lines. Though while these factors frame the British contribution to the overall situation in Basra, it is history that provides the true framework for understanding the whole process from start to the results emerging today.

“The governments that inherited the state after, like the British before them, had to resort to high levels of violence and patronage to keep the population from rising up and unseating them.” (Dodge 2003 p.158). This is not as some would think, an assessment of the new Iraqi authorities, but rather the original national government in 1933; it shows out right an historical link to the modern situation. In addition Basra, a Shiite province “dominated by a Sunni minority for 85 years” (Dodge 2007 p.26) and still shaped by the brutal retaliation against the uprising in 1991 against Saddam; is both sceptical of central control, and wary of outside help, as none came in 1991. It has a history of mercantile wealth and knows of its current potential, sitting on top of 40% of Iraq’s oil reserves (Chulov 2010). These factors do not just provide the setting and background for Basra’s re-emergence of order but contribute to understanding it on a historical and social level. The splits in tribal background such as the poor and displaced marsh Arabs fighting with those who consider them inferior can be identified along the same lines as why the Badr brigade fought against the Mahdi army. All have historical, social, ethnic and religious reasons for their differences. The very roots of why ghetto security can occur. But an examination of history can also point to why and how this can and is changing. The Basra of 90 years ago and beyond was a rich trading post which despite its many different groups was cosmopolitan and mercantile and forging its own identity (Viser 2008 p.34). Order away from identity politics was historically provided by either a repressive power, or wealth and cooperation. Therefore it was not mere optimism with which Keegan suggested that if a new Iraq could be created from the ruins of the old, Basra seemed the most promising place to start (2005 p.182).

The Basra of 2012 is very different from the one in which the majority of British troops served and where ghetto securitisation occurred.  There is growth and regeneration, which includes the re-opening of hotels, shops and parks, goes weeks without violence and has received an influx of investment form the oil industry (Chulov 2010). Considering this with the theoretical perspective of ghetto security, it must be remembered that it does not serve as an overall explanation in the re-emergence of order in Basra, in fact as examples would show it highlights the transitional period from post-conflict into an order that while an example of the desires of identity based groups, does not serve as an end state. The predictability which defines order, was a predictability of violence and identity; thus the security was limited to allegiance with an identity. That is not to stay a continued ghettoization could not occur, yet the growing co-operation under Iraqi rule, compounded by the growing power of the Iraqi military, shows that there is potential for a gradual reduction in identity politics as the sole provider of order.

Many issues shaped the re-emergence of order, some hindered and prolonged it some brought it about in a way different from the desired centralised liberal democratic approach. Whilst historical, social factors both drove sectarian differences and acted as blocks to certain approaches, such as the return of an oppressive regime; with order and power ensured security through centralised brutality.  The perspective of ghetto security is useful to understanding Basra as a post-conflict city, but theoretical approaches cannot be the only way of framing a complex issue such as the re-emergence of order. There are many empirical factors which when viewed alone can provide the basis of new perspectives; the re-emergence of order in Basra could easily be associated with the experience of the British, its success and failures acting as an ebb and flow of the security and thus order it provided. It could also be considered as the product of many years of social history; which was bound to be volatile when the oppressive Ba’athist regime was removed. Whilst ghetto security is indeed the useful in an assessment of Basra, it should not be forgotten that it is a product of both complex and simple factors and is heavily based on the ideas of a certain perspective of security and order; one that no doubt will be challenged as more literature on the subject emerges.

AL-KHALIL, S. 1991. Republic of Fear, Saddam's Iraq. London: Hutchinson Radis.

BALDWIN, D. 1997. The Concept of Security. Review of International Studies. 23(1), pp.5-26.

BBC NEWS. 2007. UK Basra Base Exit 'not a defeat'. BBC News [online]. 13 September [Accessed 8 May 2011]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6975375.stm

BBC NEWS. 2008. British Army Joins Basra Fighting. BBC News [online]. 29 March [Accessed 8 May 2011]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/7320696.stm

BUZAN, B. 2000. Change and Insecurity Reconsidered. In: S CROFT and T TERRIFF, (eds). Critical Reflections on Security and Change, London: Frank Cass, pp.1-17.

CHULOV, M. 2010. Basra in Southern Iraq has been Transformed - Thanks to Oil. The Guardian [online].11 October [Accessed 08 May 2011]. Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/11/basra-iraq-oil-city-transformed

COLE, J. 2007. Shia Militias in Iraq. In: M. BOUILLON, D. MALONE, and B. ROSWELL, (eds). Iraq Preventing A New Generation of Conflict, London: Lynne Rienner, pp.109-124.

CONFLICT, Establishing Law and Order After. 2005. Jones, S. et al. Arlington: RAND.

CORBIN, J. 2007. Basra; The Legacy. Panorama [online]. 17 December [Accessed 8 May 2011]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/7148670.stm

DODGE, T. 2003. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and A History Denied. London: Hurst and Company.

DODGE, T. 2007. State Collapse and the Rise of Identity Politics. In: M. BOUILLON, D. MALONE, and B. ROSWELL, (eds). Iraq Preventing A New Generation of Conflict, London: Lynne Rienner, pp.23-40.

HARDING, T. 2010. Iraq: British 'abandoned Basra to terror. The Telegraph [online]. 29 September [Accessed 8 May 2011]. Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/8031642/Iraq-British-abandoned-Basra-to-terror.html

HILLS, A. 2009. Policing Post Conflict Cities. London: Zed Books.

HILLS, A. 2010. The Unavoidable Ghettoisation of Security in Iraq. Security Dialogue. 41(3), pp.301-321.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. 2003. Basra: Crime and Insecurity Under British Occupation. Human Rights Watch. 15(6).

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. 2003. Off Target, The Conduct of the War abd Civilian Casualties in Iraq. London: Human Rights Watch.

KEEGAN, J. 2005. The Iraq War, The 21 Day Conflict and its Aftermath. London: Pimlico.

M.O.D. 2008. Former Iraq Commander praises Basra success. Defence News [online]. 15 August [Accessed 8 May 2011]. Available from: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/FormerIraqCommanderPraisesBasraSuccess.htm

PERITO, R. 2005. The Coalition provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified. Washington D.C.: United States Institue of Peace.

RAI, M. 2003. Regime Unchanged, Why the War in Iraq Changed Nothing. London: Pluto Press.

RUBIN, B. 2008. The Politics of Security in Postconflict Statebuilding. In: C. CALL, (ed). Building states to Build Peace, London: International Peace Institute, pp.25-49.

SMITH, S. 2005. The Contested Concept of Security. In: K. BOOTH, (ed). Critical Security Studies, London: Lynne Rienner, pp.27-62.

STEWAT, R. 2007. My Time in Governing Iraq. London: Picador.

VISSER, R. 2008. Introduction. In: R. VISSER and G. STANSFIELD, (eds). An Iraq of its regions; Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy, New York: Columbia University Press, pp.1-27.

VISSER, R. 2008. The Two Regions of Southern Iraq. In: R. VISSER and G. STANSFIELD, (eds). An Iraq of its regions; Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy, New York: Columbia University Press, pp.27 -51.

WYATT, C. 2009. Major Staggered at Change in Basra. BBC News. [online]. 30 April [Accessed 8 May 2011]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8014318.stm

 

RUSI's UK Terrorism Analysis

Just a quick post to draw attention to the Royal United Service Institutes's Report on Counter-Terrorism in an Olympic Year.

As seen in my 2012 predictions I think the security aspect of the Olympic Games will be a key talking point in the security sector in the coming months and RUSI's report is well worth a read.

http://www.rusi.org/ukta

I hope to comment on the report in a few days when I have managed to digest it all!

Lone Wolf Terror

Last week The Royal United Service Institute warned of the growing threat of lone wolf terrorists as in coming years Britons fighting and training with radical groups in Somalia and Yemen will return to the UK.

The question is then what does threat does the lone terrorist pose? The simple answer would be to assume that a lone actor is capable of achieving similar if slightly reduced results to terrorist cells, but whilst this is feasible it is perhaps more prudent to look at the different possibilities posed by a single actor than the possible similarities.

'The super empowered angry man' is a different actor to a small terrorist cell, for a start whilst sharing ideals and motives with a larger cause or terrorist organisation the motives and catalysts for action can be much more individually serving. In theory there are many more triggers that could cause a loner to act, from national to specific local issues. Unlike a terror cell which must adopt a group mentality to act, the individual is only concerned with his actions. Similarly the groupthink attitude which can influence a cells actions does not apply.

This can interpreted in many ways, while numbers can provide strength, support, logistical help and a greater will to act the lone actor is not constrained by the limiting factors such as need for meetings and planning with others. This in turn leads to the question of detection, with the communication and group element removed an individual actor can become harder to track as they are potentially harder to detect. Yet that must be considered objectively, any individual acting suspiciously round potential targets or in purchasing materials could be detected as easily as any group, it is the lack of a network or communication group that would potentially making detection harder.

A lone terrorist would have different target options to a terrorist group, it would be foolish to say this limits the threat, yet it changes its implications. For example there could be no coordinated strike such as in 7/7 and the scope for a hijack by a single actor would be limited, especially in the wary world post 9/11. Yet bombings or coordinated chemical attacks are an option, it is important to remember that it does not have to be devastating (statistically not emotionally) to produce a response of terror. Posted chemicals (fake or deadly) or a small explosive device with limited power are still capable of inciting fear; a suicide attack no matter how limited in its effect would still cause a large feel of unease amongst a population who wish to believe their government and security services are capable of thwarting terrorism.

Lone terrorists should not be underestimated, Anders Breivik perpetrator of the 2011 Norway massacre is a prime example of what a ideologically driven individual is capable of. In this situation the selection of the right target (a packed but isolated location) and one of the simplest forms of attack (a weapon carried and operated by himself) lead to tragic and horrific circumstances.

There is a final consideration, the classification of an act by a lone terrorist. Would the press, police and government recognise a lone act as terrorism or try and move the act into a crime setting. Whilst both terrorism and crime are obviously linked let us consider that there is an obvious difference between acts of violent crime and acts of violent terror. A lone wolf could in theory be considered an actor of violent crime rather than terrorism. If one thinks of the many instances of lone gunmen, assassins or bombers in the USA it is only in recent years that they have received a terrorist slant. Previously the acts were blamed on loners, mad men with violent murderous streaks, despite the perpetrators’ having strong ideologies, zealous religious ideas or cult beliefs. The risk is two fold, either an act being upgraded to a terrorist action due to the evidence of strong ideologies or beliefs, or the opposite a terrorist not being identified due to a lack of evidence (especially if harder to trace due acting alone) and the act being considered the actions of a violent loner. In the current threat environment the former is more likely than the latter.

It must be remembered that it is hard to predict whether the individuals who may return to the UK are plotting to undertake terrorist acts or will go through with acts they plan. These individuals would certainly be harder to detect than the ‘terror cells’ which has dominated recent years; but there is time for identification and investigation of these individuals currently operation overseas. For an attack to achieve its maximum potential risks would have to be undertaken by the individual in the planning stage, it is here where the cover offered by working alone can be blown. Similarly the limiting factors of working alone can limit the options and even ultimately the resolve of an individual actor, unless they are willing to carry out a hands on devastating attack similar to Norway. These limitations could make any threat or act hopefully less likely or at worst, less effective. This is no excuse for complacency rather a hopeful outlook of the lone wolf’s limitations.

Published EU Defence Essay

I have had an essay published online, its currently on the front page http://www.e-ir.info/

permant link: http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/06/the-eu-in-foreign-policy-a-military-or-civilian-power/

It discusses whether the EU is a military or civilian power, by analysing recent actions, policy and projected power. It is a detailed topical analysis and hopefully explains why the EU is mainly a civilian power in global foreign policy.

A Notable Reminder

It seems only right that I mark the start of this security blog, with the key story on the day of its launch; The guilty plea of Mohammed Chowdhury, Shah Rahman, Gurukanth Desai and Abdul Miah, 4 men who have admitted to planning to detonate a bomb at the London Stock Exchange. The men arrested in December 2010, pleaded guilty to engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism serve as reminder that terrorism on UK soil is still a very real threat.

The men, all British nationals, admitted planning to detonate a bomb at the London Stock Exchange, as part of a wider group of 9 which was plotting other attacks including letter bombs and pub bombings.

Whilst the trial and sentencing will be a matter for the news and public opinion, the more pressing questions lie within the ongoing debate over home-grown terrorism.

This case bears all the hallmarks that both students of terrorism and lovers of security based dramas are all familiar with; secluded meetings, contact over the internet, radical inspiration, logistical planning, sketches, target lists, terrorism literature and target observation. Similarly the plot being uncovered has a certain familiarity to it, MI5 surveillance, and a counter terrorism police operation. Could it be suggested that normality, a strange routine has begun to emerge in these cases?

To the security providers themselves the answer would be a resounding no, yet the layman could dismiss this as another case of radicalised fantasists who have had their comeuppance. Yet as the BBC’s Matt Prodger points out, it could have been very different there is a fine line between fantasy and realism, they could have remained undetected, they could have carried out these attacks.

The many questions, which sadly cannot be answered here, now stem from a decade of living under this threat of terrorism (and many more decades of other sources of terror). Are we safe? What threats are out there?  When will this happen again?

Yet there are more hidden questions that have a more abstract thought process, Will there ever be a successful attack, are these terrorists any good? Or have we grown more resilient, are we less disturbed by these revelations? For example think back to the amount of news time this would have gained in the post 9/11 years (admittedly this view plays to one of my key thesis that our understanding of terrorism is shaped very much by the media).

Undoubtedly there would be ways for this view to change; the most shocking would be a destructive attack itself, something which all conscious people must secretly fear in 2012, a year in which so much attention is being drawn on London and Britain. A simpler catalyst would be a plot uncovered which didn’t play to these ‘norms’, something wholly different yet equally as chilling.

I do not suggest there is complacency, certainly not in the security providers who have stepped up their role in line with the pressures of 2012.  Perhaps then in a period dominated with questions of reaching out to disenfranchised and disinterested groups with in society, the question that has always been present but never been answered over the last 10 years should once again be considered; why do these ideas of hatred, and violence grow within our country. Perhaps today, along with anniversaries of both failed and successful terrorist efforts and visual demonstrations of anti-British sentiment should be a reminder that there is still much to do on a societal level in the provision of security for the UK.