Chewing on the Wires; The Gap in Olympic Security?

It would be hard to deny that the military and security build up seen for the coming Olympic games does not provide a strong and determined image of deterrence for any would-be attacker or perpetrator of terrorist attacks. A frigate on the Thames, larger number of troops than currently in Afghanistan and batteries of Surface to Air missiles surrounding London; all contribute to a coherent and planned security effort. But is there a gap?

Theoretically this build up could be bypassed by extremely well planned and covert terrorism or a determined strike by a foreign aggressor, but realistically and thankfully this seems highly improbable. Defence Minister Philip Hammond MP has said that there is no specific threat and that the military will be in the background as 'ultimate reassurance'.

The gap then could be exposed in a much more mundane and frustrating way; low level disruptive acts carried out by those not wishing to kill or maim, but those wishing to damage credibility, cause disruption and generally hamper the success, image and idea of the games, host country and  the capitalist ideals that accompany the former.

The reports of threats from anarchist groups such as the Informal Anarchist Federation, wishing to cause low level warfare against the Olympic games points to the kind of threat in which little can be done in preparation for.

If we consider the disruption and problems caused by the theft of cable from rail infrastructure, an idea of some of the available tactics become apparent. To speculate even more, the options for a determined anarchist to cause low level damage, they need only find important cabling, electricity or communication points to damage and there would be a small but disrupting effect. If one casts their mind to any large transport, sports, leisure or shopping area it is easy to remember seeing points where an individual seeking to annoy and disrupt could cause problems.

The flip side of this consideration is that any low level disruption can be dealt with at a low level, quick repairs, contingency plans and fast responses are all tools in reacting to such disruptive tactics. Such a view however overlooks the main aim of such attacks; credibility and symbolism being damaged.

Consider for a moment the national and international grief, sympathy and response to a (highly unlikely) coordinated terrorist attack; similar sympathy would not be felt to repeated low level disruption that would hamper attendees, events and infrastructure. Such tactics would embarrass organisers, hack off spectators and further annoy Londoners who would be already combating congestion, crowds and delays.

I find the idea of a large terrorist attack highly unlikely to materialise and even less likely to succeed, yet the idea of groups undertaking disruptive acts are much more likely. These acts would probably only be defeated with quick responses and back up infrastructure. The efforts of those to annoy, hamper and disrupt may then highlight the only real 'gap' in Olympic security.

Letters from Abbottabad; Osama bin Laden's Correspondence

Thursday saw the the publishing of Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? a selection of the documents seized in the raid which ended Osama bin Laden's life. The writings, a selection from the cache of over 6000 taken, point to the frustrations of trying to control a fractioned terrorist organisation.




The specific documents which will have been carefully chosen to ensure the right message is portrayed around the anniversary of Bin Laden's assassination; one of a crippled leader with dwindling influence, but still capable of inspiring deadly acts of terrorism; thus legitimising the operation undertaken to kill him.




The documents hint at a difference of vision between Bin Laden and his successor  Ayman al Zawahiri, CNN Terrorist  Analyst  Paul Cruickshank's suggests that 'Bin Laden, who had previously played the role of chief executive in al Qaeda, was cast in the role of a meddling chairman, micro-managing and second guessing al Yazeed and al Atiyah’s decision making from afar, while Zawahiri was cast into the role of a senior board member, providing advice and input into the terror network’s decision-making whenever he could get messages through to the operational commanders.' [1] Strategic differences were present in their vision, with Zawahiri favouring attacks on US interests in the Afghanistan theatre and on US Middle East interests, with Bin Laden still wanting attacks on the US homeland. Interestingly a public statement issued by al Zawahiri on the Arab spring is seen in edited form in one of the letters found in the compound, of the 12 proposed corrections only one appears in al-Zawahiri’s speech.

Furthermore some of the documents released are letters received by Bin Laden, including suggestions of , strategic failures, mergers with other groups,name changes for Al-Qaeda and the idea of Jihad repulsing many Muslims.These coupled with mistakes Bin Laden himself acknowledges, add to the image of a man grappling with failures he has limited influence over. It is impossible to know whether the correspondence reached their intended recipient, and the documents frequently mention lack of communication from other groups. 

Whilst the letters suggest the difficulties of leadership, faced by Bin Laden, exiled and in hiding in his Pakistani safe house; there still is plenty of evidence that he was still an effective strategic planner and monitor of world events. He Falsely saw the Arab spring as evidence of the Arab worlds rebellion against American influence 'What we are witnessing these days of consecutive revolutions is a great and glorious event, and it is most probable, according to reality and history, that it will encompass the majority of the Islamic world with the will of Allah, and thanks to Allah things are strongly heading towards the exit of Muslims from being under the control of America,' [2]. 

The same letter suggest responses to how Al Qaeda should react to the changes sweeping the Arab world, yet it also shows how the leader would suggest terrorist actions, such as hostage taking down to the smallest consideration. 'As far as the French hostages with our brothers in the Islamic Maghreb, I want to warn that the atmosphere after the French standing towards the Libyan people does not condone killing the French, due to what will follow of negative reflections, after it became evident that most of the common people are supporting Sarkozy, so if we need to kill them then that should be after the end of Libyan events' [3] continuing to suggest timing any action with the french elections. 


The document, incidentally Bin Laden's last, dated 26th April 2011; a week before his death, shows his wide interest in the overall scope of operations around the Middle East; suggesting further jihadist actions in Afghanistan, requesting information on actions in Iraq, on Brothers coming from Iran, hostage taking in Somalia as well as the overall need to insight further revolution in the Arab world. In his both ideas and requests for further information he seems to still be both well informed and capable of making suggestions which would affect the tactical and strategic actions of Al Qaeda.

It is interesting from a British perspective that, in a letter  discussing the focus on the US as a tree that needs felling it is important not to get distracted by smaller branches such as the UK; 'Assume that we have cut up 30cm of the trunk of that tree. We,then, see an opportunity to use our saw to cut into one of the branches. Say a branch that represents the United Kingdom. We should ignore that opportunity, and to go back to sawing the trunk of the tree.' [4]. It compares attacking the USA like attacking the Soviet Union in the 1980s, destroying the main body of its interests lead to the collapse of the whole USSR.

 The documents also highlight:

• Bin ladens strategic use of the media, citing the need to broadcast messages via Al-Jeezera in coincidence with the 10th anniversary of 9/11.

• The fear of Drones and the need for higher security measures to prevent Al-Qaeda operatives being targeted by them. (so much so that one letter instructed on the use of tunnels for meetings, the need for precise timings and decoy cars.)

• The order to create suicide squads to target President Obama and General Petraeus 

• The strategic planning to create change in US Policy by not targeting key figures such as Vice President Joe Biden "Biden is totally unprepared for that post (the presidency), which will lead the U.S. into a crisis,"  [5].

• Strategic and Tactical considerations for groups operating in various areas to ensure that there was reduced infighting between groups.

• Tactical considerations for suicide bombers, such as operating in pairs due to the psychological stress of the action.

• Views on other groups actions as well as strategic considerations involving Muslim civilians, various countries and the overall nature and image of Al-Qaeda 

Overall the letters confirm what was already predicted of Bin Laden's  final few years in hiding; a man who still had grand strategic visions yet was limited in his ability to convey these ideas to the organisation he headed. Rifts in vision with other senior members may hint at the the direction Al Qaeda may be taking after his death. The very fact that Bin Laden had become so isolated may point that his death was not as damaging to Al Qaeda as the US may have hoped. Yet whilst the exile may have reduced his abilities of leadership it is safe to assume from evidence within the published documents that in removing the man who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks, not only was revenge achieved but that also a key strategic thinker, adviser and visionary  was removed from the top position of Al Qaeda.

1. Bin Laden documents: Competing vision of Al Qaeda’s top two, By Paul Cruickshank, CNN Terrorism Analyst may 7th 2012
2.  Letters from Abbottabad: SOCOM - 2012 0000010
3.  Ibid
4.  SOCOM-2012-0000017-HT
5.  Bin Laden documents: The plotting continued, By Mike Mount May 3rd 2012

The Self Starter of Toulouse

What has emerged in the aftermath of the shootings in Toulouse has pointed at another spin on the 'lone wolf' theory; that of the motivated self starter. Despite travelling in regions associated with terrorist and insurgent training camps, finding the call of militant Islam and acting in line with religious beliefs it seems Mohamed Merah undertook these actions alone.

The evidence from his actions and background points to a dangerous cocktail of extremist views, a psychotic mindset and a criminal past mixing together to create a man who was capable of carrying out ruthless attacks, up in close proximity with his victims.

 

There were worrying signs from Merah's past; he had allegedly become obsessed with gory terrorist videos and attempted to radicalise Muslim youngsters in his neighbourhood. He reportedly was also a juvenile delinquent, guilty of a host of low level crimes whilst  paradoxically also being into football, theft, women and drinking, not the usual traits of a fundamentally inspired terrorist.

 

In the individual case of Merah the questions now lie with what assistance was provided by those close to him and should he been identified as a threat sooner? ,The issue of whether he should of had closer attention paid to him by France's domestic intelligence agency (DCRI) is a key point for debate, Yet there is a fine line between radical viewpoints and radical actions, keeping tabs on everyone identified as having a radical view becomes a dangerous undertaking...easily capable of inspiring action by those who feel threatened.

The theoretical interest for understanding this and possible future acts like this, lies with two considerations; Is the 'motivated self starter' even more of a threat than the 'lone wolf'? and how much fear is inspired by acts relatively simple to plan and carry out?

 

The 'lone wolf' (as discussed in  http://csaware.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/lone-wolf-terror.html)  has considerable advantage over the planning and logistical problems faced by small terrorist cells, yet can still be tracked and monitored due to established links and training with terrorist organisations; for example the UK threat of lone wolves points directly to extremists returning from time in countries such as Somalia. Let us for a moment assume that the reports are true and that Merah had no link with Al-Qaeda and that the supposed regional organisations were more inspirational than providers of training; that points to the idea that this 'lone wolf' was able to radicalise and inspire himself to undertake the acts which brought terrorism to the streets of Toulouse. In theory this then becomes the biggest threat, the idea that an individual can be inspired to commit terrorism with little contact with others, to take it one step further Merah could even be an exception in that there were warning signs in his travel and previous acts of violence and crimes, theoretically there could be motivational self starters who could achieve terrorist acts with few or no hints from their past pointing to radicalisation.

 

The acts themselves point to an even more worrying threat; the effectiveness of simple small arms attacks. The events in France have shown that a relatively small number of targets chosen for their religious or ideological significance can shock a country and induce fear, anger and response, all desired outcomes of terrorism. The fact this was achieved by the use of firearms points to the fact that simple conventional violent actions are still easily capable of causing shock and panic. Such actions avoid the chance of detection linked with acquiring explosive ingredients or even more obscure CRBN materials. Guns, whilst still causing suspicion, are far more often linked to the criminal class and thus do not raise the same alarms as more 'traditional' terrorist plots would. Merah was even able to incorporate the suicide martyr element into his actions with his last stand shoot out against police.

The counter consideration in the case of Merah and also in Norwegian massacre carried out by Anders Breivik are that these are two examples of individuals with psychotic and mental issues leading them to carry out violent actions in line with their religious and ideological views. Though undoubtedly identifiable as acts of terrorism they could be argued as horrific crimes which in  post 9/11 age have been linked under the ever growing umbrella of terrorist actions. However what is far more worrying is the idea that these 'lone wolves' are self starters, individuals who have been able to radicalise and arm themselves, giving them the ability to carry out violent acts with little or no help. The brutally simplistic nature of these acts also points to a much more simplified approach in terrorist acts one that is ultimately much harder to detect or predict.

The Power of the Strategic Corporal

Events in Afghanistan over the last few weeks have given prime examples of the dark side of the 'strategic corporal' theory; the idea that the actions of individuals of lower ranks on the ground affect the overall strategic perspective of a conflict zone. The burning of the Korans at the end of last month and the massacre committed by the lone soldier in Kandahar on Sunday contribute to the strategic picture faced by US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan far more than the actions and ideas of senior generals. Based on this theory a conflict zone essentially is shaped by two different strategic actors, the traditional grand strategy framework of army planners, policy makers, generals etc. and the real time strategic picture contributed by the actions of anyone on the 'frontline'. In ideal practise the element of the 'strategic corporals' is in line with and acting on behalf of the large policy based strategy element, yet as these recent events have shown there are increasing scenarios of when the strategic approach of the leaders has been damaged by the actions of soldiers on the business end of the campaign.

In historical reflection the 'strategic corporal' is not as new a concept as some would think, in recent history it is easy to think of the 'strategic lieutenant' in Vietnam, where platoon or company sized actions had the most immediate affect on the strategic picture of parts of the war zone. Earlier still small groups of men would affect the outcomes of skirmishes and battles throughout history if used correctly or tactically in the right place, these would usually be the product of prior planning yet some came from the quick thinking of men on the ground. However these contributed to the military strategic outcome and that is where the historical concept differs from the contemporary; that the actions of individuals in a conflict situation affect far more than just military victory or defeat.

The true idea of the 'strategic corporal' was coined by General Charles C. Krulak in the title of an article in Marines Magazine about the "Three Block War," an increasingly important arena of military operations defined by engagement with hostile, neutral and friendly forces, all at the same time, in a very geographically limited area. If used positively the idea suggests that the lowest ranked NCOs are directly influencing the conflict area on behalf of the main strategy. Though as seen recently the effects are equally as profound if they are acting irresponsibly.

Two sides of the strategic corporal.
 Above: on the ground directly winning hearts and minds.
Below: Marines urinating on Taliban corpses

The fact that a conflict such as Afghanistan has far more actors than just the US and enemy combatants means that the actions of a strategic corporal have far more bearing than they have ever had in history. The native population, media, allies, enemy forces, enemy sympathises, foreign observers and charities are all part of those initially affected by the actions of an individual or small group. This coupled with the speed of the modern media and social communication mean that a massacre such as Sunday has travelled round the world just as quickly as high strategic planners are trying to limit the backlash from such an event.

As such the overall strategic picture is dependent on the actions and image portrayed by the 'frontline' soldiers. It should not be forgotten that for the large amount of troops currently stationed in Afghanistan incidents remain rare, yet it only takes one or two to upset the fragile, if non existent stability that ISAF try to maintain. In a strange paradox of the current 'lone wolf' scenario that western planners continue to raise, the same can be seen in affecting the strategic picture that the US and its allies want to put forward, one that can easily be affected by the actions of one lone actor.

The questions now are concerned with exist dates and strategies, while it will be debated and guessed at by commentators and policy makers alike the bigger question is of course related to legacy. For any positive actions or strategic planning for stability, massacres, cultural misunderstandings or mistakes committed by individuals will undo them. It is for that reason that in modern conflict situations the strategic results are no longer primarily military and nor are they sole responsibility of planners and generals, in fact they have shifted to the soldiers who are exposed to the environment day in and day out. For that reason the importance of the 'strategic corporal' can not be underestimated, whether being utilised for success or in the worst case scenarios of mistakes and incidents.

Lone Wolf Terror

Last week The Royal United Service Institute warned of the growing threat of lone wolf terrorists as in coming years Britons fighting and training with radical groups in Somalia and Yemen will return to the UK.

The question is then what does threat does the lone terrorist pose? The simple answer would be to assume that a lone actor is capable of achieving similar if slightly reduced results to terrorist cells, but whilst this is feasible it is perhaps more prudent to look at the different possibilities posed by a single actor than the possible similarities.

'The super empowered angry man' is a different actor to a small terrorist cell, for a start whilst sharing ideals and motives with a larger cause or terrorist organisation the motives and catalysts for action can be much more individually serving. In theory there are many more triggers that could cause a loner to act, from national to specific local issues. Unlike a terror cell which must adopt a group mentality to act, the individual is only concerned with his actions. Similarly the groupthink attitude which can influence a cells actions does not apply.

This can interpreted in many ways, while numbers can provide strength, support, logistical help and a greater will to act the lone actor is not constrained by the limiting factors such as need for meetings and planning with others. This in turn leads to the question of detection, with the communication and group element removed an individual actor can become harder to track as they are potentially harder to detect. Yet that must be considered objectively, any individual acting suspiciously round potential targets or in purchasing materials could be detected as easily as any group, it is the lack of a network or communication group that would potentially making detection harder.

A lone terrorist would have different target options to a terrorist group, it would be foolish to say this limits the threat, yet it changes its implications. For example there could be no coordinated strike such as in 7/7 and the scope for a hijack by a single actor would be limited, especially in the wary world post 9/11. Yet bombings or coordinated chemical attacks are an option, it is important to remember that it does not have to be devastating (statistically not emotionally) to produce a response of terror. Posted chemicals (fake or deadly) or a small explosive device with limited power are still capable of inciting fear; a suicide attack no matter how limited in its effect would still cause a large feel of unease amongst a population who wish to believe their government and security services are capable of thwarting terrorism.

Lone terrorists should not be underestimated, Anders Breivik perpetrator of the 2011 Norway massacre is a prime example of what a ideologically driven individual is capable of. In this situation the selection of the right target (a packed but isolated location) and one of the simplest forms of attack (a weapon carried and operated by himself) lead to tragic and horrific circumstances.

There is a final consideration, the classification of an act by a lone terrorist. Would the press, police and government recognise a lone act as terrorism or try and move the act into a crime setting. Whilst both terrorism and crime are obviously linked let us consider that there is an obvious difference between acts of violent crime and acts of violent terror. A lone wolf could in theory be considered an actor of violent crime rather than terrorism. If one thinks of the many instances of lone gunmen, assassins or bombers in the USA it is only in recent years that they have received a terrorist slant. Previously the acts were blamed on loners, mad men with violent murderous streaks, despite the perpetrators’ having strong ideologies, zealous religious ideas or cult beliefs. The risk is two fold, either an act being upgraded to a terrorist action due to the evidence of strong ideologies or beliefs, or the opposite a terrorist not being identified due to a lack of evidence (especially if harder to trace due acting alone) and the act being considered the actions of a violent loner. In the current threat environment the former is more likely than the latter.

It must be remembered that it is hard to predict whether the individuals who may return to the UK are plotting to undertake terrorist acts or will go through with acts they plan. These individuals would certainly be harder to detect than the ‘terror cells’ which has dominated recent years; but there is time for identification and investigation of these individuals currently operation overseas. For an attack to achieve its maximum potential risks would have to be undertaken by the individual in the planning stage, it is here where the cover offered by working alone can be blown. Similarly the limiting factors of working alone can limit the options and even ultimately the resolve of an individual actor, unless they are willing to carry out a hands on devastating attack similar to Norway. These limitations could make any threat or act hopefully less likely or at worst, less effective. This is no excuse for complacency rather a hopeful outlook of the lone wolf’s limitations.

Syria: Homs shelling

Recommended to me by a journalist friend of mine, an insightful video and article from the BBC detailing the current shelling of Homs in Syria. 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16902819

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A Notable Reminder

It seems only right that I mark the start of this security blog, with the key story on the day of its launch; The guilty plea of Mohammed Chowdhury, Shah Rahman, Gurukanth Desai and Abdul Miah, 4 men who have admitted to planning to detonate a bomb at the London Stock Exchange. The men arrested in December 2010, pleaded guilty to engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism serve as reminder that terrorism on UK soil is still a very real threat.

The men, all British nationals, admitted planning to detonate a bomb at the London Stock Exchange, as part of a wider group of 9 which was plotting other attacks including letter bombs and pub bombings.

Whilst the trial and sentencing will be a matter for the news and public opinion, the more pressing questions lie within the ongoing debate over home-grown terrorism.

This case bears all the hallmarks that both students of terrorism and lovers of security based dramas are all familiar with; secluded meetings, contact over the internet, radical inspiration, logistical planning, sketches, target lists, terrorism literature and target observation. Similarly the plot being uncovered has a certain familiarity to it, MI5 surveillance, and a counter terrorism police operation. Could it be suggested that normality, a strange routine has begun to emerge in these cases?

To the security providers themselves the answer would be a resounding no, yet the layman could dismiss this as another case of radicalised fantasists who have had their comeuppance. Yet as the BBC’s Matt Prodger points out, it could have been very different there is a fine line between fantasy and realism, they could have remained undetected, they could have carried out these attacks.

The many questions, which sadly cannot be answered here, now stem from a decade of living under this threat of terrorism (and many more decades of other sources of terror). Are we safe? What threats are out there?  When will this happen again?

Yet there are more hidden questions that have a more abstract thought process, Will there ever be a successful attack, are these terrorists any good? Or have we grown more resilient, are we less disturbed by these revelations? For example think back to the amount of news time this would have gained in the post 9/11 years (admittedly this view plays to one of my key thesis that our understanding of terrorism is shaped very much by the media).

Undoubtedly there would be ways for this view to change; the most shocking would be a destructive attack itself, something which all conscious people must secretly fear in 2012, a year in which so much attention is being drawn on London and Britain. A simpler catalyst would be a plot uncovered which didn’t play to these ‘norms’, something wholly different yet equally as chilling.

I do not suggest there is complacency, certainly not in the security providers who have stepped up their role in line with the pressures of 2012.  Perhaps then in a period dominated with questions of reaching out to disenfranchised and disinterested groups with in society, the question that has always been present but never been answered over the last 10 years should once again be considered; why do these ideas of hatred, and violence grow within our country. Perhaps today, along with anniversaries of both failed and successful terrorist efforts and visual demonstrations of anti-British sentiment should be a reminder that there is still much to do on a societal level in the provision of security for the UK.