The Re-emergence of Order in Basra

Examining the re-emergence of order in the post conflict city of Basra through investigating key theoretical perspectives.

As the British military mission in Iraq came to its conclusion, Basra’s fate as a post-conflict city passed to the Iraqis. In 6 years of British control from April 2003 to April 2009, there had been numerous problems for the occupying military, the 1.5 million inhabitants of Iraq’s second largest city (Human Rights watch 2003 p.1) and the various bodies that tried to implement security within the city. Order and security, contested concepts as they are, had to a degree re-emerged. However, it was not the western liberal orthodox perspective of order that had grown in Basra. It was instead the challenge to this view, (and approach to its implementation) which saw “the main sub-state factions share out state-based resources, running the police and controlling the revenues from oil smuggling and the distribution of political power (Hills 2010 p.317). Whilst this perhaps overlooks the violence and crime which supports the factional approach within the city, it does give a clear idea of along what lines order re-emerged within Basra; the concepts of identity and ghettoisation of security. Three years later, as the city emerges as a much more stable and peaceful place, (Guardian 2010) it is important to consider what events dominated the post- conflict environment and kept it locked in factional power struggles, in which order and security took on very different forms, to the centralised control of today. This essay will therefore show how useful the perspective of ghettoisation is to an understanding of Basra, but also explain there are other factors which contributed to the overall process. I will argue that while the theoretical process is indeed the main source of understanding, this builds on historical and empirical factors and may also be due to the lack of analytical literature on the subject.

The literature on Basra, as with Iraq as a whole, presents a range of different perspectives. Not only is it hard to avoid the heavy bias towards the USA’s involvement, but there is also the mixed feeling of the war’s legitimacy and legality. In addition various actors and commentators report the situations with significant bias towards their own agendas, be it military, humanitarian or the critical approach of the press and anti-war protesters. The British press, for example, repeatedly cited growing public opinion turned against the deployment of UK forces and stories shifted to the growing futility of occupation, which does not necessarily give an accurate portrayal of the overall process of order re-emergence. It is the academics such as Hills, Dodge and Cole who present more grounded views based on security and post conflict theories; one of the reasons ghetto security is such a useful tool is that it accompanies one of the few overall assessments which is not dominated by cynical or military bias. It is Hills that presents the idea of the “ghettoization of security, whereby specific groups or types of people are secure in only restricted areas” (Hills 2010 p.303) as part of the unique environment created in cities and directly links it to Basra. As a theoretical perspective based on empirical evidence it provides a strong starting point from which to examine order re-emergence.

In order to effectively consider the re-emergence of order in Basra two theoretical concepts must be assessed, firstly the concept of order itself. Order is linked with both security and power, yet the link is not horizontal as power ultimately becomes the dominating factor. As Hills points out “order and security are interwoven, but while security facilitates order, order is necessary for meaningful security” (2009 p.2). While a liberal orthodox view would automatically assume that order is the same as security, that is to fall into the trap of what is desired under a liberal democracy; as Hills argues order is an agreed set of rules, repressive or democratic based on regularity and predictability (2009 p.11). It should also be remembered then that if security can be the tool to achieve order, security therefore becomes desirable to those who want order. Similarly, power which is inherent in actors is “the most fundamental in post-conflict cities as it underpins and is expressed through order and security” (Hills 2009 p.15). Therefore it is possible to have order without security, but order requires someone to be exerting power to make that order. To consider in the context of pre-war Basra, order was maintained by the Saddam regime as an expression of its power. The order was repressive and brutal, but still provided security. It was certainly not the kind of security that human security advocates could promote but it differed massively with the insecurity present in looting and violence which followed the regime’s collapse.

Order in the context of Basra as a post-conflict city is therefore based on the new symbols of power, and as the Ba’athist regime was not replaced with an equal, or similar centralised system of control instantaneously, the power to provide order did not come from a central national source. In fact it was the void created by the sudden collapse of all centralised control and its means of implication that meant order in Basra had to come from a regional source. Urbanization, as Hills reminds us, is based on social relationships and therefore has many actors present (2010 p.304). Of these, no single power emerged at the conclusion of the war as the dominant winner, the regime and its infrastructure including the police and army was melting away.  The Shia militias, which were to become hugely influential, were actually weak at the cessation of hostilities (Cole 2007 p.111); the only group with the force to do anything along the lines of creating an instant repressive order were the British. Not only had they no intention of doing this, they actually went the other way allowing a breakdown in order in terms of looting as a symbol of the end of the previous regime. This at the time was tolerated, as a British officer pointed out due to powerful message it sent “that we are in control now, not the Ba’ath party” (Financial Times 2003, cited in Hills 2009 p.109). The British sought order through security, though through allowing its initial breakdown, the other actors of Basra could adopt this approach as well. Therefore the re-emergence of order in Basra became inseparably linked with actors seeking to provide security as a tool to achieve order, as a legitimizing factor of their power. This in turn affects the population who “look to whichever group offers them the best chance of survival” (Talentino 2004, cited in Dodge 2007 p.26); the main theme of the second crucial concept to be examined; the ghettoization of security.

Ghetto security is arguably the most applicable theoretical perspective in an assessment of Basra. Whilst other theories, such as self perpetuating spirals, or corruption could be examined, it is the ideas ghetto security and its explanation of the importance of identity as the referent object of security, which make it the most applicable to Basra. “Security is an essentially contested concept” (Baldwin 1997 p.7) but it becomes easier to apply one of its concepts to situation, if we can dismiss the ideas based around those that would argue for one of its other perspectives. Hills is quick to assert “exclusionary actors of local or sectarian groups are more influential than those of state based agents or projects based on security for the individual” (2010 p.301). Whilst accepting  security is not just about survival, (Smith 2005) as this would mean individuals acted independently, the idea of ghetto security puts identity as its main form of security; and thus a group of a shared identity as the referent object. The individuals’ security concerns become part of the group, much along the lines of Buzan’s identification of societal security and identity (2000). As Dodge points out “the struggle to gain a degree of predictability for yourself and your family becomes obtainable primarily through an increasing militant deployment of ethnic or sectarian identity” (Dodge 2007 p.26). Thus the growth of militias in Basra can be explained not by the human security, or emancipation theories, which cynically could be considered the most ‘liberally attractive’ but Hills dismisses as “detracting from the realities of post conflict security” (2010 p.302). Instead the growth of the militias and the security they wish to enact was along much older foundations of tribal and religious groupings.

The value of ghettoisation in understanding the re-emergence of order in Basra should not be overlooked; it provides an anchor from which to base an explanation of a very complex series of events and groups which came about in the post-conflict city. There is not space for a detailed narrative of events, nor would it be useful, it is much more prudent to look at two areas which highlight ghetto security in action; the growth of militia power and the post conflict role of the police. The rise of the militias grew from the lawlessness that took hold in the early days of the British Occupation, two crucial factors mark their appearance. Firstly that whilst the violence and destruction, apparent during the looting and early stages of post war Basra was ultimately the initial source of security failure to the British; it was the catalyst for sectarian groups to begin to act in providing security.  As Dodge points out, militias grew in this early phase from a few men guarding streets into neighbourhoods, and then districts as people sought protection (2007 p.35). Sadrist mosques organised vigilantes and water supplies (Hills 2009 p.112) whilst groups had to provide armed men to protect hospitals, and infrastructure (Human Rights Watch 2003). Even the groups who did not embark on ensuring security took this opportunity to become stronger, joining the looting or taking part in carjackings. The sectarian elements born in this early phase, were quickly compounded by the military occupation of the city, which by its very nature divides the city up in the use of roadblocks, division of units and patrols; (Hills 2009 p.41) thus helping the identity politics flourish.

Secondly, the sectarian divisions which categorised the ghettoisation of Basra were deepened further with the democratic, governance and security approach of the British and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Policies and actions intended to increase security and establish conventional bases of power meant a furthering of divisions as the groups sought more power for their identity. Not only was this an increase of “public services, economic subsistence and physical survival, through ad-hoc and informal channels” (Dodge 2007 p.26) this was a re-emergence of the products to create order based on the very issues that the British and CPA would identify as destabilising elements; predominantly violence. Al-Karamisha marsh Arab tribe fought with Shia militias after its leader was targeted (Cole 2007 p.119). The Badr brigade who provided much of Basra’s security clashed with Fadhila, represented in the police by Chief al-Waili (Cole 2007 p.118). Main political parties were divided against each other and provincial councils were contested as to their ethnic make-up.  As the coalition attempted “human rights, constitutional reform, free markets and feminism” (Stewart 2007, cited in Hills 2010 p.308) militias provided a more traditional option for either security and opportunity or violence and resistance. Sectarian groups used (in)security as a way to gain goals and achieve a degree of (dis)order depending on their motives (Hills 2010). Economic infrastructure, political allegiance and security provision all became part of the wider struggle by sectarian groups. As Rubin reminds us, “without the separation of politics and politicians from violence and the regulation of the latter by law, civilian politics and politicians are impotent” (2008 p.36). Based on this view it is then prudent to consider the law element, which further contributed to the ghettoisation, as was seen through divisions in the police.

The police in Basra represented not only another prime example of the inherent identity divisions which point to the theoretical process championed by Hills, but also one of the weaknesses which dragged out the re-emergence of order process. What little police remained after the fall of the regime were the lowest rung of an oppressive security apparatus, “30 years of neglect had left the Iraqi National Police (INP) with low standards, poor management and a firehouse mentality, remaining in their stations until ordered to make arrests”(Perito 2007 p.3). It is wrong to assume as Ria does that re-employing the 500 officers who returned in April 2003 was “re-nazification and re-employing  functionaries of the torture state” (2003 p.112) as the evidence shows that even if they were former Mukhebarat officers, the British had them under such a tight leash they were virtually powerless. Spread thin (“by mid 2003 just 900 unarmed local police and 48 British MPs policed 1.5 million inhabitants” (Hills 2009 p.47)) and constrained to be subservient to a British approach any image the police could maintain security and subsequently the traditional sense of order, had gone. It was only through mass recruitment that the police managed to gain any power and this was due to the infiltration of its ranks by the militias; thus sucking the police into the sectarian provision of order.

The growth in police numbers grew with an increase in groups attempting to provide security and the divisions split up the re-emergence of order along these sectarian lines. Police vehicles openly showed their factional allegiances, whilst policemen joined the various groups to feel protected. Different parts of the police belonged to different political groups and these in turn controlled different areas of the city; Fahila and the tactical support controlled the oil terminals, whilst Moqtada and the regular police held the ports and customs (Hills 2009 p.111) Police commanders feared the power of the militias who controlled their men and certain units would only patrol certain areas for their own safety. Whilst these divisions played havoc with the British desire to attempting police reform, the alternatives to the identity based system where apparent. Though some of the population called for a return of the brutal former police force if it meant more security (Human Rights Watch 2003 p.20 and Stewart 2007, cited in Hills 2010 p.308). Incidents such as the destruction of the Jameat police group in 2006, which combined all major factions in torture and brutality (Hills 2009 p.111); served as a reminder that ghetto order was more desirable than former centralised security.

It would be wrong however to think there were no other factors contributing to the overall state of Basra. The British military for example is a large contributing factor to the re-emergence of order; its initial actions allowed the breakdown which created a partial security vacuum, for the identity politics to flourish and concessions the British granted compounded its growth. In addition to this there are more simple factors contributing to the drawn out process of the re-emergence of order, such as the hindrance to security presented by the low UK troop numbers and the military approach to protecting installations and personnel rather than policing and concentrating on crime. In addition there was a lack of any form of civilian policing authority in great numbers. The latter factor along with many others was recognised in 2003 and was known long before from lessons of previous British missions such as Kosovo (Human Rights Watch 2003). Even anti-British feeling had a role; as an identifying factor for Basra residents which went across sectarian lines. Though while these factors frame the British contribution to the overall situation in Basra, it is history that provides the true framework for understanding the whole process from start to the results emerging today.

“The governments that inherited the state after, like the British before them, had to resort to high levels of violence and patronage to keep the population from rising up and unseating them.” (Dodge 2003 p.158). This is not as some would think, an assessment of the new Iraqi authorities, but rather the original national government in 1933; it shows out right an historical link to the modern situation. In addition Basra, a Shiite province “dominated by a Sunni minority for 85 years” (Dodge 2007 p.26) and still shaped by the brutal retaliation against the uprising in 1991 against Saddam; is both sceptical of central control, and wary of outside help, as none came in 1991. It has a history of mercantile wealth and knows of its current potential, sitting on top of 40% of Iraq’s oil reserves (Chulov 2010). These factors do not just provide the setting and background for Basra’s re-emergence of order but contribute to understanding it on a historical and social level. The splits in tribal background such as the poor and displaced marsh Arabs fighting with those who consider them inferior can be identified along the same lines as why the Badr brigade fought against the Mahdi army. All have historical, social, ethnic and religious reasons for their differences. The very roots of why ghetto security can occur. But an examination of history can also point to why and how this can and is changing. The Basra of 90 years ago and beyond was a rich trading post which despite its many different groups was cosmopolitan and mercantile and forging its own identity (Viser 2008 p.34). Order away from identity politics was historically provided by either a repressive power, or wealth and cooperation. Therefore it was not mere optimism with which Keegan suggested that if a new Iraq could be created from the ruins of the old, Basra seemed the most promising place to start (2005 p.182).

The Basra of 2012 is very different from the one in which the majority of British troops served and where ghetto securitisation occurred.  There is growth and regeneration, which includes the re-opening of hotels, shops and parks, goes weeks without violence and has received an influx of investment form the oil industry (Chulov 2010). Considering this with the theoretical perspective of ghetto security, it must be remembered that it does not serve as an overall explanation in the re-emergence of order in Basra, in fact as examples would show it highlights the transitional period from post-conflict into an order that while an example of the desires of identity based groups, does not serve as an end state. The predictability which defines order, was a predictability of violence and identity; thus the security was limited to allegiance with an identity. That is not to stay a continued ghettoization could not occur, yet the growing co-operation under Iraqi rule, compounded by the growing power of the Iraqi military, shows that there is potential for a gradual reduction in identity politics as the sole provider of order.

Many issues shaped the re-emergence of order, some hindered and prolonged it some brought it about in a way different from the desired centralised liberal democratic approach. Whilst historical, social factors both drove sectarian differences and acted as blocks to certain approaches, such as the return of an oppressive regime; with order and power ensured security through centralised brutality.  The perspective of ghetto security is useful to understanding Basra as a post-conflict city, but theoretical approaches cannot be the only way of framing a complex issue such as the re-emergence of order. There are many empirical factors which when viewed alone can provide the basis of new perspectives; the re-emergence of order in Basra could easily be associated with the experience of the British, its success and failures acting as an ebb and flow of the security and thus order it provided. It could also be considered as the product of many years of social history; which was bound to be volatile when the oppressive Ba’athist regime was removed. Whilst ghetto security is indeed the useful in an assessment of Basra, it should not be forgotten that it is a product of both complex and simple factors and is heavily based on the ideas of a certain perspective of security and order; one that no doubt will be challenged as more literature on the subject emerges.

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